Trade, Technology and Security: Implications for East Asia and the West: Part I

  • Hanns Maull
Part of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Papers book series (IISSCP)

Abstract

Any foray into the interstices of economics and security faces something of a paradox: talking about security and economics in one breath seems almost a contradiction in terms. While economics is about entrepreneurial risk-taking, security policies strive to reduce risks; economics is about dynamic change, about ever new, ever tenuous equilibria, while ‘security’ is often used almost as a synonym for ‘stability’ or at least for controlled change; in the economic realm, firms — often operating across national boundaries in informational markets — are the principal actors, in security matters, it is national governments. The two activities therefore tend to pull their interwoven strands apart. This difficulty might explain why the relationship between economics and security has not been explored conceptually in international relations theory with anything like the attention paid, for example, to the relationship between power and security.

Keywords

Depression Europe Stake Poss OECD 

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Notes

  1. 4.
    See David Buchan, ‘Western Security and Economic Strategy Towards the East’ (London: IISS 1984), Adelphi Paper No. 192, pp. 23ff; idem, ‘The West Plugs the High-Tech Drain’, in Financial Times, 25 July 1984. The agreements reached on the revision of the list included most importantly and controversially the areas of computer hardware, software and telecommunications. The CoCom list itself is secret, its contents can, however, be deduced from national control lists, which are open. In the case of the Federal Republic, the CoCom list revisions were implemented in the 55th revision of the German export list in October 1985. As a consequence, the Bundesamt für gewerbliche Wirtschaft, which deals with export licence applications, expects the annual number of applications to double from 70,000 to 140,000. See Wolfgang Hoffmann, ‘Eine zweischneidige Waffe’, in Die Zeit, 14 September 1984.Google Scholar
  2. 5.
    See Werner Hein, ‘Beschränkungen des internationalen Technologie-Transfers durch die USA’, Washington, dc (mimeo) 1984; Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, ‘Fortgeschrittene Technologie in den Aussenbeziehungen der USA’, in Aussenpolitik, No. 4/1985, pp. 400–12Google Scholar
  3. 7.
    Total Western high-technology exports to the USSR in 1983 came to about $2.3 bn. Allen Lenz and Ken Stiltner, ‘Quantification of Western Exports of High-Technology Products to Communist Countries Through 1983’, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, (Washington, dc: usgpo 1985).Google Scholar
  4. 11.
    For European perceptions of this type, see Hein, (op. cit. in note 5); Jacobsen, (op. cit. in note 5); Gerd Junne, ‘Das amerikanische Rüstungsprogramm: Ein Substitut für Industriepolitik’, in Leviathan, No. 13/1985, pp. 23–37. See also Japan Times, 1986, Mainichi Daily News, 22 September/12 August 1986.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Institute for Strategic Studies 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hanns Maull
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsUniversity of MunichGermany

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