Abstract
As the emigration movement matured, both domestically and internationally, the Soviet leadership faced an expanding campaign. The attempt in the 1968–73 period to bifurcate policy toward growing Jewish ethnic identity by permitting the most pro-Zionist and religious Jews to emigrate while simultaneously discouraging emigration among the remaining (majority) segments of Soviet Jewry was unsuccessful. Permitting Zionists and religious Jews to leave not only failed to weaken pressure for emigration, but among mainstream Soviet Jewry, it actually stimulated further demand. Once it became clear that emigration presented a viable alternative for Soviet Jews, growing numbers chose to take advantage of it. By 1974 a new phase in emigration, which was to last until the end of the decade, had begun.
There is no social basis for emigration in the USSR. We have no unemployment, there is no poverty in the country. The Soviet constitution guarantees all citizens vital social rights. Living standards are constantly rising. The Leninist nationalities policy ensures the equal development of all nations and nationalities in our country. Boris Shumilin, USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, 19761
Young Jewish mathematicians are not accepted in many universities and graduate schools; they find it difficult, at best, to obtain appropriate work.
The problem is increased a hundredfold because, like some shameful disease, one cannot discuss it openly. One cannot speak of something which ought not to exist. If I do, I risk everything — my work, my profession, my family, even my life. Grigori Freiman, 19782
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Notes
Grigori Freiman, ‘A Soviet Teacher’s “J’Accuse”’, New York Times Magazine (25 November 1979), p. 122. This article was adapted from a longer samizdat piece.
See ‘Leaving the Soviet Union: The Emigrant’s Experience’, in United States, Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Two Years After Helsinki, report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th Congress, 1st session, 23 September 1977, p. 183; Victor Zaslaysky and Robert J. Brym, Soviet Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 49–51;
James R. Millar, ‘History, Method, and the Problem of Bias’, in James R. Millar (ed.), Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ), pp. 19–20.
Zaslaysky and Brym, Soviet-Jewish Emigration, pp. 61–2. Similar results were reported by Gitelman in a survey conducted in 1976 among 244 recent Soviet immigrants in Detroit. Gitelman reported that the heartlanders indicated they left the USSR for reasons of political alienation and anti-Semitism, while the zapadniki (westerners) were motivated by family and economic considerations. See Zvi Gitelman, ‘Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 7 (Spring 1977), pp. 41–3.
Theodore H. Friedgut, ‘Soviet Jewry: The Silent Majority’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 10 (May 1980), pp. 17–19.
For example, a numerus clausus policy was outlined in a 1970 book by Soviet ideologist V. Mishin. Mishin called for the reduction of ‘overrepresented’ specialists with higher education and an equalization in the development of all peoples and nations in the USSR based on the principle of proletarian internationalism. Vasilii Mishin, Obshchestvenny progress [Social Progress] (Gorky: Volgo-Viatskoye, 1970)
William Korey, ‘The Legal Position of Soviet Jewry: A Historical Enquiry’, in Lionel Kochan (ed.), The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917, 3rd edn ( Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1978 ), p. 102.
Aleksandr Voronel, ‘The Aliyah of Russian Intellectuals’, Midstream 22 (April 1976), pp. 29–30.
For a personal account on the restricted admission of Jews to mathematics faculties see Grigori Freiman, ‘A Soviet Teacher’s “J’Accuse”’, New York Times Magazine (25 November 1979), pp. 122–7.
See also Boris Smolar, Soviet Jewry Today and Tomorrow ( New York: Macmillan, 1971 ), pp. 71–7.
Zvi Gitelman, ‘Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways’, Problems of Communism 29 (January–February 1980), p. 32.
The Refugee Act of 1980 omitted the ideological and geographical restrictions that previously favored conditional entry for refugees from Communist-dominated areas and the Middle East, and instead considered a refugee to be a person with a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’. The definition of ‘refugee’ incorporated in the Refugee Act of 1980 basically conforms to that of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See United States, Congress, Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–212, in United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, vol. 1 (1980), pp. 94, Stat. 102–18.
David Harris, ‘A Note on the Problem of the “Noshrim”’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 6 (Autumn 1976), p. 110. (‘Noshrim’ is the Hebrew word meaning ‘drop-outs’.) The decision of several thousand Soviet Jews to re-immigrate to another country after first immigrating to Israel also influenced subsequent emigrants in their choice of adopted country; Israeli sources put the number of Soviet Jews who first immigrated to Israel and subsequently chose to re-immigrate elsewhere at 10 000 (3.8 per cent) for the period from 1968 to 1985. In a 1985 article Pinkus estimated that 12 000–18 000 (4.5–6.8 per cent) of Soviet Jews had left Israel.
See Benjamin Pinkus, ‘National Identity and Emigration Patterns Among Soviet Jewry’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 15 (November 1985), p. 25.
The first Soviet consular mission to Israel in 20 years arrived in July 1987 and the first Israeli consular mission to the USSR in 21 years arrived in July 1988. Although the official reason for the Israeli mission to the USSR was to inspect the Israeli consular office that the Dutch Embassy had managed on its behalf since Soviet–Israeli ties were severed in 1967, it was reported that Soviet officials unofficially disclosed that they viewed the visit as an opportunity to improve the Soviet Union’s influence with Israel and relations with American Jews. See Bill Keller, ‘Israelis in Moscow: A Bit of Banter, and Prayers’, New York Times (30 July 1988 ), p. A4.
For information on the debate over the destination of the emigrants see Robert Pear, ‘Closing the Door Halfway for Emigrant Soviet Jews’, New York Times (24 September 1989), sec. 4, p. 3;
Yoram Dinstein, ‘Free Entry To All Corners’, Jerusalem Post (16 January 1989), p. 4; ‘A Rift in the Making’, Jewish Week ( 13 January 1989 ). The change in US practice is discussed at length in Chapter 5.
For information on refuseniks see, for example, Mark Ya. Azbel, Refusenik: Trapped in the Soviet Union ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981 );
Martin Gilbert, The Jews of Hope: The Plight of Soviet Jewry Today ( London: Macmillan, 1984 );
Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil, trans. Stefani Hoffman ( New York: Random House, 1988 ).
General Secretary Gorbachev stated on the eve of his October 1985 visit to France that the declassification period for state secrets ranged from 5 to 10 years. Nonetheless, people who have been removed from classified work for longer than a 5 to 10 year period have been routinely denied emigration permits. See ‘M. S. Gorbachev Address on French Television’, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union 3 (2 October 1985), p. G10; Institute of Jewish Affairs, Human Contacts, Reunion of Families and Soviet Jewry (published on behalf of the International Council of the World Conference on Soviet Jewry in Cooperation with the Jewish Communities Concerned, 1986), p. 31. The state secrets classification and time limitations are to be addressed by a new law on entry into and exit from the USSR, which by September 1990 had yet to be passed by the Supreme Soviet.
See Jeffrey Barist, Owen C. Pell, Eugenia Oshman and Matthew E. Hamel, ‘Who May Leave: A Review of Soviet Practice Restricting Emigration on Grounds of Knowledge of “State Secrets” in Comparison with Standards of International Law and the Policies of Other States’, Hofstra Law Review 15 (3) (Spring 1987), pp. 434–7;
Gerald F. O’Keefe, ‘Soviet Legal Restrictions on Emigration’, Soviet Unionl Union Soviétique 14 (3) (1987), pp. 301–41.
See English translation, ‘Types of Information Classified as State Secrets by a Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, 28 April 1956’, in Elizabeth C. Scheetz, ‘State Secrets and the Right to Emigrate’, Radio Liberty Research, RL 82/77 (13 April 1977), pp. 7–10. A 1947 decree on state secrets, which was superseded by the 1956 decree was issued in Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ( 8 June 1947 ). For an English translation see ‘On the Establishment of a List of Information Comprising State Secrets, Disclosure of Which Shall be Punished by Law’, in Scheetz, ‘State Secrets and the Right to Emigrate’.
For information on the history leading up to the CSCE, see Mojimir Povolny, ‘The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference’, Orbis 18 (Spring 1974), pp. 201–30;
Harold S. Russell, ‘The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?’, American Journal of International Law 70 (April 1976), pp. 244–6.
The Final Act is not a treaty; it contains a provision that declares it ineligible for registration as a treaty under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Suzanne Bastid, ‘The Special Significance of the Helsinki Final Act’, in Thomas Buergenthal (ed.), assisted by Judith R. Hall, Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun for the American Society of International Law, 1977), p. 13. Interestingly, the USSR wanted a legally binding instrument because it thought anything less would dilute the Final Act’s impact. For its part, the US favored non-binding status which would enable it to conclude an international agreement without Congressional consent. See Russell, ‘The Helsinki Declaration’, pp. 246–9. Ironically, the USSR fell short of many of its Basket Three commitments while the US became extremely active in demanding compliance.
Oscar Schachter, ‘Editorial Comment: The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’, American Journal of International Law 71 (April 1977), p. 300. Louis Henkin wrote: ‘That the Helsinki Accord is not legally binding means there are no legal remedies for their [sic] violation; adherence to the Accord is nonetheless an international undertaking and violation of them [sic] is a proper basis for international (non-legal) recourse and remedy by other participants’. Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and “Domestic Jurisdiction”’, in Buergenthal, Human Rights, p. 25.
The USSR ratified the ICPR but it has accepted neither of the optional complaint provisions: the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which grants individuals the right to petition the UN Human Rights Committee in relation to alleged violations; and Article 41 of the ICPR, which provides an optional procedure for inter-state complaints. However, the Soviet Union announced in March 1989 that it would accept the binding arbitration of the International Court of Justice in disputes arising from the following five human rights documents sponsored by the United Nations: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1953), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966); International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1949); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). See Paul Lewis, ‘Soviet To Accept World Court Role in Human Rights’, New York Times (9 March 1989), pp. A1, A15.
See US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1989), pp. 25–9. The details of the Vienna Concluding Document are discussed later in this chapter.
See paragraph 24 in Decree no. 1064, ‘O vnesenii dopolneniya v Polozhenia o vezde v Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i o vyezde iz Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik’ [On the Introduction of Additions to the Regulations on Entry Into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and on Exit From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], 28 August 1986 (effective 1 January 1987) in Sobranie postanovlenii Pravitelstva SSSR, Section One, no. 31 (1986), item 163, pp. 563–6. The application of the so-called first-degree relative rule was first noticed in Odessa, and by the end of 1979 was reported as being enforced in Kharkov, Kiev, Kishinev and Tashkent. See United States, Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 96th Congress, 2nd session, 1 August 1980, p. 208.
United States, Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 97th Congress, 2nd session, November 1982, p. 165.
United States, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, p. 167; United States, Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 100th Congress, 1st session, March 1987, pp. 35–6.
Z. Alexander, ‘Jewish Emigration from the USSR in 1980’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 11 (May 1981), p. 8;
Elie Valk, ‘Jewish Emigration from the USSR: Up in 1979 — Down in 1980’, research report, rev. (New York: Soviet Jewry Research Bureau of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 15 June 1980 ), p. 1.
See United States, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, p. 166; Bernard Weinraub, ‘The Kremlin is Said to Seize Mail From the U.S. for Jews’, New York Times (9 June 1983), p. A10. During or shortly after the end of 1984, decreasing requests for invitations (prompted by limited permissions) reduced the number of invitations being sent to the USSR and postal problems became less frequent.
The purpose of the Committee was stated in an appeal issued on 1 April 1983 calling for the Committee’s creation. See Pravda (1 April 1983). For information about the Anti-Zionist Committee see Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Public Opinion: Aims and Tasks (Moscow: Novosti, 1983); Theodore H. Friedgut, ‘Soviet Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism — Another Cycle’, Soviet Jewish Affairs 14 (February 1984), pp. 11–22;
Julia Wishnevsky, “‘Anti-Zionist Committee” Formed in Soviet Union’, Radio Liberty Research, RL 170/83 (26 April 1983 );
Lukasz Hirszowicz and Howard Spier, ‘Eight Soviet Jews Appeal for the Creation of an Anti-Zionist Committee’, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, no. 6 (April 1983);
Howard Spier, ‘The Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee — Further Developments’, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, no. 13 (August 1983);
Howard Spier, ‘Fulfilling a Restricted Role: The Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee in 1984’, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, no. 16 (December 1984).
For example, see United States, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, p. 211; United States, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, pp. 170–1; ‘Soviet Jews: Weather Permitting’, The Economist (9 February 1985), pp. 49–50; Anthony Lewis, ‘Crime and Punishment’, New York Times (14 February 1985 ), p. A31;
Elie Wiesel, ‘Appeals for Refuseniks’, New York Times (22 October 1985), p. A31.
United States, Department of State, Fourteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, December 1, 1982–May 31, 1983, Special Report no. 109 (1983), p. 23.
United States, Department of State, Ninth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, June 1, 1980–November 30, 1980, Special Report no. 77 (1980), p. 15.
Donna L. Gold, ‘Soviet Jewry: U.S. Policy Considerations’, E 190 For. USSR, Report No. 85–88S, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (17 April 1985 ), p. 23.
See ‘The “Third Basket” for Deputies: How the USSR Fulfils [sic] its Vienna Commitments’, interview conducted by Andrei Bezruchenko with Professor Yuri Kashlev in Moscow News, no. 45 (12–19 November 1989), p. 11. Kashlev also stated in the interview that 299 refusenik cases were upheld on review, i.e. in those cases the decision to deny permission to emigrate was confirmed. Kashlev was the head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna CSCE meeting and at the time of this writing was assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. See also Jews in the U.S.S.R., 19 (2) (17 January 1990).
See Andrew Rosenthal, ‘Soviet Anti-Zionist Agency May Go’, New York Times (8 December 1987), p. A16;
Ari L. Goldman, ‘Soviet Jews to Join World Congress’, New York Times (4 January 1989), p. A9.
The Vienna Concluding Document called for the simplification of administrative requirements and practices regarding visa applications and stipulated that documents submitted in connection with an emigration application would remain valid during the entire application procedure. It also provided for refusals to be made in writing (in the past they were made orally) and for an explanation and information regarding administrative or judicial remedies to accompany negative decisions. Laws and regulations regarding movement within one’s country and between the 35 participant states in the CSCE process were to be published domestically and made easily accessible by January 1990. See US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting (January 1989), pp. 26–7.
See ‘Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields’ in Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting, p.24. The text of the draft law may be found in Sidney Heitman, ‘A Soviet Draft Law on Emigration’, Soviet Jewish Affairs, 19 (3) (Winter 1989), pp. 41–5.
See S. Rogov and V. Nosenko, ‘Chto skazal “A” i chto skazal “B”’, [What ‘A’ Said and What ‘B’ Said], Sovetskaya kultura (9 February 1989 ), p. 6.
For information on religious developments see ‘First Yeshiva in 60 Years Opens in the Soviet Union’, JTA Daily News Bulletin 37 (24 February 1989) [JTA is the Jewish Telegraphic Agency]; Esther B. Fein, ‘Lasting Faith of Soviet Jews Moves Wiesel’, New York Times (13 February 1989), pp. Al, A14;
Ari L. Goldman, ‘Moscow to Get Academy of Jewish Learning’, New York Times (19 February 1989), sec. 1, p. 25;
Oxana Antic, ‘The Situation of Religious Jews in the USSR: 1987–1989’, Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 (47) (24 November 1989), pp. 7–9. For other developments see Jews in the U.S.S.R. 18 (1989); Jews in the U.S.S.R. 19 (1990).
Pamyat, one of the best known of the Russian nationalist societies, was created in 1980, ostensibly for the preservation of Moscow’s historical and cultural monuments. By late 1985 it emerged as an extreme Russian nationalist, anti-Semitic organization responsible for revitalizing the notion of a Zionist-Freemason conspiracy to take over the world (a theme first popularized in the 1905 Protocols of the Elders of Zion). Howard Spier states that belief in the Zionist-Freemason conspiracy against the Russian people has deep roots in Russia. By late 1985 it emerged as an extreme Russian nationalist, anti-Semitic organization responsible for revitalizing the notion of a Zionist-Freemason conspiracy to take over the world (a theme first popularized in the 1905 Protocols of the Elders of Zion). Howard Spier states that belief in the Zionist-Freemason conspiracy against the Russian people has deep roots in Russia. ‘It was the rallying-cry of the Black Hundreds organization, the Union of the Russian People, a reactionary monarchist and antisemitic body that fought against the planned reforms following the 1905 revolution.’ Howard Spier, ‘Soviet Antisemitism Unchained: The Rise of the “Historical and Patriotic Association Pamyat”’, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, no. 3 (July 1987), p. 4.
See ‘Letters to the Editor’, Moscow News 32 (14–21 August 1988), p. 2; Esther B. Fein, ‘For Moscow Jews, Fear of Prejudice is Stirring’, New York Times (5 August 1988), p. A2; ‘Ovations and Posters in Court’, Moscow News 37 (17–24 September 1989), p. 15;
Irina Ginzburg, ‘We Russian Jews Fear for Our Lives’, New York Times (5 May 1990), p. 25.
For example see Pavel Gutiontov, ‘Podmena’ [Substitution], Izvestia (27 February 1988), p. 3.
See L. Dymerskaya-Tsigelman, ‘Anti-Semitism and Opposition to it at the Present Stage of the Ideological Struggle in the USSR’, Jews and Jewish Topics in Soviet and East-European Publications 7 (Summer 1988), pp. 3–29; ‘Letters to the Editor: Understanding Pamyat’, Moscow News, 13 (2–9 April 1989 ), p. 4;
Francis X. Clines, ‘Anxiety Over Anti-Semitism Spurs Warning on Hate’, New York Times (2 February 1990), p. Al; ‘Do We Have to Wait for Bloodshed?’, Moscow News 7 (25 February-4 March 1990), p. 14. For a sampling of Pamyat’s documents see ‘Documents of the Pamyat’ Association’, Jews and Jewish Topics in Soviet and East-European Publications 7 (Summer 1988 ), pp. 30–4.
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© 1992 Laurie P. Salitan
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Salitan, L.P. (1992). Post-Zionist Emigration. In: Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968–89. St Antony’s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09756-2_4
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