Abstract
Recently attention has been focused on open-economy monetary policy games in which today’s target variables are affected by credible announcements about future money supplies.1 In this paper we provide examples of this type of monetary policy game and draw some lessons from them.2
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© 1988 International Economic Association
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Canzoneri, M.B., Henderson, D.W. (1988). Time Consistency and Trigger Mechanisms in Open-Economy Monetary Policy Games. In: Borner, S. (eds) International Finance and Trade in a Polycentric World. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09745-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09745-6_12
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