The New Strategic Policy of 1922

Abstract

By spring 1922 Lloyd George was in decline, for even if Austen Chamberlain remained loyal to him, many ministers and sections of the Conservative Party were no longer. These determinants shaped Lloyd George’s strategic decisions. So as to overcome the controversy surrounding the Geddes Committee’s recommendations, he had to establish Cabinet committees to examine its civil and armed service proposals. He made Churchill the chairman of the committee (including Montagu, Lord Birkenhead and Baldwin) to examine the service ones. Although the Geddes Committee’s proposals were politically vital to Lloyd George, he had to give colleagues of questionable loyalty the power to challenge its recommendations. When Britain reached its decision on these matters, Lloyd George confronted another political danger, for his advisors warned him that should Churchill resign over Anglo-Soviet negotiations at the Genoa Conference, he would gain much die-hard Conservative support. Given Churchill’s ties with some Asquithian Liberals and Cecilite Conservatives, he might even focus every Parliamentary faction which opposed Lloyd George and thus threaten the Coalition. Although Churchill probably had no such intention, he was ready to work with the opposition to defend the RAF had the Cabinet rejected his views on that question.¹ In any case Lloyd George could not trust Churchill but equally dared not antagonise him needlessly.