Strategic Policy and Diplomacy, 1919–22

Abstract

After the armistice Britain wanted to dominate the Middle East, maintain its maritime security and establish a new balance of power in Europe and the Pacific. In the belief that Britain would continue to be secure and achieve its diplomatic aims during the foreseeable future, the government formulated its strategic policy of 1919. When these assumptions proved unrealistic, strategic policy had to be altered. Even in the best circumstances Britain would have had to curb some of its ambitions in order to secure the remainder through an accommodation with other powers. The need for such alterations arose when unexpected events, like the US withdrawal into isolationism, hampered British policy. Since the government overestimated the strength of its diplomatic position, however, it declined the compromises needed to accommodate other states. Consequently Britain found it increasingly difficult to further its foreign policy and came to believe that other nations were challenging its vital interests, while the balance of power which Britain had hoped would underwrite its security did not emerge. The prospect of strategic cooperation with the United States receded, which caused Britain to reconsider the wisdom of its commitments to France and Japan. Simultaneously, statesmen came to think that many nations, especially a coalition centred on Russia, could threaten Britain.