Abstract
By December 1918 Britain had emerged a victor from the great war as had the coalition government from the coupon election. This government had a unique opportunity to strengthen Britain’s position in the world and to formulate an effective strategic policy. It failed to do so because of overconfidence and adverse circumstances. Lloyd George dominated the Cabinet, supported by Bonar Law, the Conservative Party leader and Lord Privy Seal, while the Finance Committee composed the inner Cabinet. By 1920 its members were Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and the ministers for the departments involved in strategic policy: Curzon, Long, Churchill, Austen Chamberlain, Montagu, the India Secretary and Milner, the Colonial Secretary. This government had great ambitions: to establish British hegemony over the Middle East, a stable balance of power in Europe and the Pacific, and close ties with several victor powers. On the assumption that Britain would be secure during the forseeable future, while the world would become stable, it intended to use the August 1919 principles to govern service policies.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
4 Strategic Principles and Service Policies, 1919–20
Roskill, Naval Policy pp. 103–16; Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnaught to Scapa Flow, The Navy in the Fisher Era, Volume V: Victory and Aftermath (January 1918—June 1919) (1970) passim; McDonald, ‘Search’.
William Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1901–1922 (1971) pp. 171–209;
David F. Trask, Captains and Cabinets, Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918 (1972) pp. 356–59.
Roberta Allbert Dayer, ‘The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 45 (1976).
Montgomery Hyde, Air Policy p. 46; Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (1961) pp. 5–20.
Barnett, Army pp. 410–12; Liddell Hart, Memoirs pp. 100–01; Bond, Military Policy pp. 127–32; George Patrick Armstrong, The Controversy Over Tanks in the British Army 1919 to 1933 University of London Ph.D. thesis (1976).
Basil Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Volume 1, 1914–1939 (1959) pp. 207–10, is the only historian to have noted that the army’s loss of the role of substitution in Iraq negatively affected its mechanised policy.
CID paper, No. 255—B, CAB 4/7; Keith Jeffery, ‘Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918–22’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History vol. 5 (1977).
Boyle, Trenchard pp. 365–69; Leo Amery, My Political Life, Volume 2: War and Peace, 1914–1929 (1952) pp. 201–02;
Lord Ismay, Memoirs (1960) pp. 29–35;
John Barnes and David Nicholson, (eds) The Leo Amery Diaries. Volume I, 1896 to 1929 (1980) p. 263.
The best published sources are Geoffrey Archer, Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East African Administrator (1963) pp. 96–114 and
Patrick Kitabura Kakwenzire, Colonial Rule in the British Somaliland Protectorate, 1905–1939 University of London Ph.D. thesis (1976).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1989 John Robert Ferris
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ferris, J.R. (1989). Strategic Principles and Service Policies, 1919–20. In: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–26. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09739-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09739-5_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-09741-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-09739-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)