Red to Move and Win

Abstract

The final phase of the Polish crisis of 1980/81 saw the fruition of Moscow’s strategy: the reaffirmation, beyond any doubt, of Soviet domination of the state of Poland. In the Autumn of 1981 the Kremlin — through an unrelenting press campaign — had made a scapegoat of Solidarity, the better to justify coercion of the PUWP to prepare to implement a crackdown. Pressure by Moscow in the form of the third CPSU letter, sent against the backdrop of the largest Soviet manoeuvres in the region since the end of the Second World War, galvanised the PUWP leadership and led to the ascendance of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the man chosen to serve as the Pétain of Poland. Concurrently, seemingly oblivious to these developments, the United States continued inflexibly its dual strategies of warning against Soviet military intervention and inducing moderation by the Polish régime through financial incentives, although these pursuits had already been overtaken by events. It would continue along this primrose path to the bitter end of the Polish crisis, led by the Soviet leadership in cooperation with Jaruzelski, who undertook a masterful deception.