Abstract
Robbins’s Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (ENSES)is one of the two most important methodological statements by any economist this century and the single most important until the appearance of Friedman’s classic essay.1 It is, then, instructive to examine the origins of this book which first appeared in 1932. It seems clear that the book originated in at least three different considerations. The first, as Robbins recounts in his Autobiography,was the need, as Robbins saw it, to reformulate economics in such a way that it could take account of non-materialwelfare and also of destructive activities which nevertheless were chosenand which used resources —principally, war. This was not a difficult step, given the marginal want-satisfaction of Wicksteed and the Austrians.2 But it was a fundamental departure from Cannan’s position, in which materialwelfare was given a central place, as Robbins was very much aware.
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Notes and References
Friedman (1953); Blaug (1980) p. 87; Stewart (1979) p. 126.
(1971a) p. 146; see also (1953b) p. 104; (1935a) p. 129 (throughout the pagination of the second edition of ENSESwill be cited); (1929c) p. 249.
(1927a).
(1935a) pp. 147–8, 151.
(1938c) pp. 635–7; see also (1963a) pp. 12–19.
Young (1913); Robbins (1934a).
Preface to second edition of ENSES,(1935a) p. viii; (1963a) pp. 7–12; (1949a) p. 103; (1971a) pp. 147–8.
Baumol (1987).
(1938a).
(1930b) pp. 23–4.
(1947c) p. 54: ‘The economic problem is essentially a problem of regulating the quantities which go to different uses and securing some rough equality of yield at the margin. It is a problem not of priority but of allocation.’
Hutchison (1981) p. 189.
A better idea of Robbins’s sources can be obtained from the first edition of ENSESrather than from the more widely available second edition. In particular, seven of the Mises references in the first edition are missing from the second edition.
Blaug (1980) p. 87.
(1968a); (1981) pp. xiii, xxviii-xxix.
(1963a) pp. 12–19; (1981) p. xxii.
(1935a) pp. 74, 82, 96, 105; see also Blaug (1980) pp. 87–9; Mill (1825), (1844) pp. 25, 312, 314–17, 325, 329, 332.
(1981) p. xx; Jevons (1871) p. 85; Robbins (1934b) p. 95; (1953b) p. 108; (1933) p. xvi.
(1934b) p. 95; (1936a) pp. 6–7; (1970b) p. 176; see also Wicksteed (1910) pp. 766–7; Jevons (1871) pp. 84–6, 94–121; Blaug (1962) pp. 309, 334.
(1935a) pp. xii, xv–xvi, 55,96; (1970b) pp. 189–209 especially p. 209.
(1930d); Coase (1982) p. 33.
Robbins (1933) p. xiv.
Blaug (1962) p. 488.
Wicksteed (1910) chs. 1, 2, 6.
(1935a) p. 55; Wicksteed (1910) pp. 212–400.
Robbins (1933) p. xvii.
See especially Wicksteed (1910) Book III.
Weber (1949) p. 52; Robbins (1935a) p. 148; see also p. xii — when Souter (1933) attacked Robbins’s positivism, Robbins referred him to Weber. See also Kirzner (1976) p. 209 n.12 for Weber’s use of scarcity.
(1935a) pp. 90, 148; Weber (1949) pp. 1–47 especially p. 11; Hutchison (1979); Bendix (1968) p. 495.
Weber (1949) p. 162; see also Lachman (1976).
(1934d) p. 57; (1937b) p. 237; (1939a) pp. 128–30.
(1939b) pp. 52–3, 73n.
See especially (1930a); (1934a).
(1970b) pp. 210–14; (1933) p. xx.
In (1934c) Robbins refers to ‘goods of first order’ — cf. Menger (1871) pp. 92–109 and Wieser (1889) Books III and IV.
See Addleson (1984). See also Knight (1934) p. 661 (who identified Wicksteed with the Austrians) and Hicks (1979) p. 358.
Robbins has indeed been criticised by some of the modern ‘Austrians’ but as Hutchison has shown, the correspondence of modern ‘Austrians’ with the older Austrians is less than complete (1981) pp. 187–9. See also Kirzner (1976) p. 161.
(1935a) pp. xv–xvi. See also (1930b) and Addleson (1984).
(1935a) p. 77n; (1971a) p. 107.
(1935a) pp. 16, 18, 39, 54, 77, 78, 83, 89. Most of the references in (1935a) are to Mises’s Gemeinwirtschaft(1932) which was translated as Socialism.See also (1930b).
(1935a) p. 83.
(1935a) p. 145.
The contrast is evident in the discussion of Kirzner (1976) pp. 159–63; see also Stewart (1979) p. 154. On Mises’s a priorismsee also Rothbard (1968); Mises (1949) pp. 31, 55,350–7.
(1971a) p. 16. The famous definition refers to Menger, Mises, Fetter, Strigl and Mayer.
(1935a) p. 96; (1934a); (1933) p. xvi; (1981) p. xiii; see also Addleson (1984); Hutchison (1981) pp. 187–9. But there is an important question here, raised by Wiseman (1985); the later Austrians, such as Mayer, emphasised a more passive form of subjectivism than had Menger and Wieser — the consumer now responded, computationally, to data. It is an open question how far Robbins himself accepted this shift of emphasis though the present writer believes that, for the most part, he did do so.
(1935a) p. 16.
(1935a) p. 16. See also Hutchison (1981) p. 226n.
(1930d) p. 257. The work which has never been translated into English is Schumpeter (1908). Pp. 521–626 of it deal with methodological questions and the role of pure theory. See also Lachman (1976); Hutchison (1981) p. 205; Kirzner (1976) pp. 68–70.
Menger (1871) pp. 58–9, 129–30; Wieser (1889) p. 176.
(1935a) pp. 67–8. But Robbins later became much more critical of the Austrians — see (1966f).
(1935a) pp. 55, 67; Wicksteed (1910) pp. 212–400; Robbins (1933) p. xvi; (1934a) pp. 11, 14–15; (1930a); see also J. M. Buchanan (1973).
See especially (1934c) p. 465. There are also general equilibrium considerations in (1927b) pp. 124–9 — labour-saving inventions may indicate a larger rather than a small optimum population, in contrast to the partial equilibrium conclusions derived from looking at individual industries.
(1971a) p. 160 (‘the the-industry fallacy’); (1954) pp. 201–25; (1947c).
(1934a).
(1929a); (1930c).
Kirzner (1974) pp. 38, 94–6, 147–8. See also note 45 above.
(1939a) p. 42.
(1930d) p. 257.
J. M. Buchanan (1968) p. 425.
J. M. Buchanan (1968) p. 426 sees Knight as the economist as philosopher rather than scientist. However, both Knight and Robbins (1957e) p. 399, agreed that economics differed from natural science because people learn.
(1935a) pp. 16,83.
Young (1925b).
Cannan (1914) ch. 1.
(1971a) p. 105. See also (1926c).
(1971a) p. 146.
(1935a) pp. 20, 87, 88.
Cassel (1925) pp. 28–9.
Cassel (1925) pp. 30–1, 46–7.
Cassel (1925) pp. 88–9.
Wicksteed (1910) p. 766.
Robbins (1932a) p. 96.
Addleson (1984) p. 520; Blaug (1980) p. 90; see also Stewart (1979) pp. 121–6; Hicks (1983). Cooter and Rappoport (1984) p. 521 assert that ‘much of Robbins’s argument was anticipated by Frederic Benham (1930)’. Benham’s article is certainly valuable, and it is indeed unfortunate that it should have been so completely overshadowed by ENSESas to become more or less completely forgotten. However the limited content of Benham’s short article, the wealth of other sources on which Robbins drew, and had been drawing for some time before the appearance of Benham’s paper, the nature of Robbins’s 1927 review of Hawtrey — which in fact Benham acknowledged (p. 174n) as making his central point — and Robbins’s own account of the genesis of ENSES(1971a pp. 146–7) all combine to make Benham an unlikely source, particularly as he went so far as to reject the subjective elements in value theory and to describe (p. 187) marginal utility as a ‘question-begging term’ — Robbins in ENSES(1935a) pp. 20, 87, 88 was to be critical of similar elements in Cassel’s work.
Cannan (1932).
(1914) ch. 1.
(1935a) pp. 4–11.
Beveridge (1937).
Knight (1934a) p. 225n. Other reviews are by James (1933) who regarded the work as ‘too metaphysical and subjective’ and by Peck (1936) who argued that the book represented an outdated individualism. See also Kaufman (1933), who criticises Robbins by implication.
Souter (1933).
Parsons (1934) p. 516.
Parsons (1934) p. 515.
Parsons (1934) p. 516.
Harrod (1938).
Robbins (1938c); see also (1938a).
Fraser (1932) p. 558.
Fraser (1932) pp. 566, 569.
Robbins (1935a) p. viii. See also (1939d) p. 295. It is rather puzzling that Robbins seems neither to have reviewed nor referred to Hutchison (1938) which Wiseman (1985) p. 149 refers to as a ‘point by point critique’ of ENSES.The review by Pirou (1936) was sufficiently non-committal, though it recognised the importance of the work, to make reply unnecessary.
(1935a) p. 1; see also (1959) pp. 32–5.
(1934a) p. 1.
See Meade (1984) on Robbins’s Oxford lectures.
(1935a) pp. 2–3; (1930b) pp. 16, 24; (1930a) p. 194; see also Hutchison (1979).
(1949a).
(1927a); see also (1935a) p. 91; Weber (1949) p. 11.
(1935a) p. 151; (1927a) p. 177.
(1963a) pp. 12–19.
(1976a) pp. 2–3 and n.
(1938c) p. 638; (1934c) p. 464–5; (1971a) pp. 147–8; (1935a) p. 87; (1939a) p. 164; (1959) p. 45; (1932d) pp. 173–4; (1953b) pp. 107–8.
(1935a) pp. 88–90, 106; (1981) p. xviii; (1963a) pp. 6–7, 19; (1938c) p. 639; (1927a); (1971a) pp. 147–8; Hutchison (1964) pp. 18–19; Weber (1949) p. 52; Menger (1883) p. 46; Kirzner (1976) p. 137; see also Mill’s science/art distinction (1844) p. 312.
(1934b) p. 100.
(1935a) pp. 4–6; (1953b) p. 104; see also Hutchison (1964) p. 172.
(1935a) p. 96. See also (1926c) pp. 224–5 for a defence of Robinson Crusoe methodology.
(1934b) p. 100; (1935a) pp. 90–4.
(1935a) pp. 92–4; cf. Mises (1949) p. 103 and n; Wicksteed (1910) pp. 32–4.
Wicksteed (1910) pp. 75, 212–65; Wieser (1889) Bk I; Robbins (1935a) p. 56 citing Menger.
For example (1932a) p. 56 (omitted from 1935a p. 56); (1935a) p. 93; Mises (1932) p. 93; Robbins (1934) p. 41; (1936) pp. 113–22; (1953b) pp. 102–4.
(1953b) pp. 103–4. However Robbins introduced elements of cardinality by recognising degrees of difference — see Robertson (1954) pp. 668, 677 and (1955).
(1935a) pp. 7, 12, 14, 30.
(1935a) pp. 16, 30, 152–3; (1930b) p. 24; (1954) pp. 201–25; (1934c) p. 465; see also Menger (1871a) pp. 52–3, (1871b) pp. 94–5.
Robbins (1935a) pp. 87–8; (1971a) p. 147.
(1935a) pp. 32, 67–8, 70–1, 73, 76–7;(1971a) p. 147.
J. S. Mill could be oneof the sources for this distinction (1844) pp. 314–17.However Weber is the main source — (1949) p. 162 and cf. Robbins (1934c) p. 465.
(1935a) p. 16; (1963a) p. 28. Cf. Weber (1949) p. 52.
(1935a) p. 24. See also (1931e) p. 470.
(1935a) pp. 24–5, 30, 145; see also Blaug (1980) p. 149.
(1974b) pp. 9–10.
(1938c) p. 638.
(1954) pp. 201–2; cf. Mises (1933) p. 89: ‘Wenn jemand für nationale Autarkie eintritt, sein Volk vom Verkehr mit den übringen Völkern abschliessen will und bereit ist, alle materiellen und ideellen Folgen solcher Politik zu tragen, um das angestrebte Ziel zu erreichen, dann ist das eine Wertung, die man als solch mit Argumenten nicht zu widerlegen vermag.’
(1963a) p. 22.
(1971a) p. 147; (1935a) p. 31 citing Wicksteed (1910) pp. 155–7; (1939b) pp. 116–17; cf. Wieser (1914) p. 5; Weber (1949) pp. 67–8. Fraser (1932) p. 557 charged that Robbins had in fact smuggled in an economic endin the form of rational, maximising behaviour, only to concede this on p. 141 (1932a) and p. 157 of (1935a).
(1971a) p. 147.
(1935a) pp. 73–5, 78, 104–6; (1938a) pp. 347–9; (1971a) p. 149.
Mises (1933), (1949). The whole tone of Wieser (1889) is a priori.
Blaug (1962) pp. 697–8; see also Stewart (1979) pp. 118–23 for a discussion of a priorism.
Mill (1844) p. 325.
Cairnes (1875) pp. 5–6,48.
See in particular Hicks (1935), Lavington (1921) pp. 29–35 cited by Robbins (1935a) p. 78. It is ironic that one reviewer of the first edition of ENSES(James 1933) interpreted the book to be an attack on the English methodological tradition.
On the verstehendoctrine see Blaug (1980) pp. 47–9 and (in relation to Robbins) p. 88.
(1935a) pp. 89, 104–5; Cairnes (1875) pp. 75–6; Mill (1844) p. 329; see also Wieser (1914) pp. 4, 8; Hutchison (1981) p. 227n.
(1935a) pp. 73–5.
(1935a) p. 140; (1938c) p. 637.
(1935a) pp. 106–9, 132; (1981) p. xvi; (1938a) pp. 349–51; see also (1930d) p. 258; (1929b) p. 82; (1972a) p. 134; Addleson (1984) p. 517.
(1957e) p. 399; (1981) pp. xvi–xvii.
(1935a) p. 109.
See in particular Learner (1983).
(1935a) pp. 131–5.
Lipsey (1963) pp. 158–61.
See Stewart (1979) pp. 50–69; Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) pp. 91–132.
Popper (1934) pp. 252–4.
(1935a) pp. 73–5. Fraser, whose critique has recently been endorsed by Cooter and Rappoport (1984) believed not only that induction was necessary (1932 pp. 564–5) but that ‘The certainty of many of the best attested laws of physics is rather a matter of high inductive probability than of necessity.’ (1932 p. 560).
Robbins (1928a) pp. 390–1.
(1935a) p. 111; (1971a) p. 149; (1966b) p. 27; (1979a) p. 81; (1971b) pp. 149, 166; (1963a) p. 162; cf. Mises (1949) pp. 55–6; Cairnes (1875) pp. 115–16.
(1935a) p. 111.
(1981) p. xvii.
(1935a) p. 121.
(1935a) p. 112.
(1935a) pp. 114–15. (1938a) is however less overtly hostile to empirical work. Fraser (1932 p. 565n) accused Robbins of unfairness to the Institutionalists — unfortunately supporting his claim with a reference which is clearly inaccurate.
(1981) p. xvii; (1934b) p. 99.
Beveridge (1937) p. 467.
Beveridge (1937) p. 464.
Beveridge (1937) pp. 463, 465.
Robbins (1938b) pp. 12–13.
Robbins (1928b) p. 250; Young (1925a) pp. 240–5, 250–9. Robbins (1938b) which is relevant here is translated in an Appendix to this volume.
Robbins (1938b) pp. 18–19.
(1935a) pp. 56–7.
In his famous article on the elasticity of demand for income in terms of effort Robbins, having established that it was not possible to decide from a priorireasoning whether the individual supply curve of labour was positively or negatively sloped, concluded that ‘any attempt to predict the effect of change in the terms on which income is earned must proceed by inductive investigation of elasticities. The attempt to narrow the limit of possible elasticities by a priorireasoning must be held to have broken down.’ (1930c) p. 129. See also, on observation (1930b) pp. 20–1.
(1937a); (1959) p. 44.
(1934d) has a substantial Appendix (pp. 201–38) containing 36 statistical tables.
(1970b) p. 80.
Peston (1984).
Blaug (1980) p. 91.
(1935a) pp. 116–19 (and cf. 1959 p. 44); (1937a); (1934c) p. 465; (1971b) pp. 188–9; (1938a) p. 352.
(1938b) p. 161.
Cairnes (1875) p. 85; Weber (1949) p. 148; Mises (1960) pp. 86–8. See also Mill (1844) pp. 326–30.
(1963a) p. 43.
(1971a) pp. 149–50; cf. (1932b) p. 428 and p. 429; (1934d) contains elements of ‘verification’ and ‘testing’ though Henderson (1935) saw it as engaging in ‘verification’.
Cairnes (1875) pp. 91–2 and cf. pp. 150–1.
(1939b). This was perceived by one contemporary reviewer — Staley (1939).
(1932b) especially p. 428.
(1981) pp. xiv–xv; (1939b) p. 121; (1932b) pp. 428–9.
(1959) pp. 43–4. This seems to have confused some later commentators who regarded Robbins as having adopted a Popperian position — see in particular Peston (1981) pp. 185–6; see also Lipsey (1963) p. 158n.
(1929b) p. 73; (1929a) p. 27. See also Hutchison (1938) p. 106 for criticism of this.
Notes 127, 132, 152 above. This is again consistent with the work of Cairnes and some of the Austrians — see Cairnes (1875) pp. 77,108–9; Mises (1949) p. 31; and contrast Hutchison (1981) pp. 187–9 (on Menger), 203–4 (on Böhm-Bawerk) and 205 (on Wieser).
(1963a) p. 43.
(1932a) p. 81. This was however omitted in the second edition of ENSES(1935a). Mises (1949) pp. 350–2. See also Lachman (1976) and Cairnes (1875) pp. v–vii.
(1971a) p. 118.
Samuelson (1972) p. 8; Baumol (1972) pp. 14–15; see also Baumol and Seller (1979).
(1935a) pp. 83–6; (1934b) especially pp. 95, 98–9; see also (1927a) p. 175.
(1934b) pp. 97–8; see also (1953b) p. 102. Behaviourism could not cope with expectations and analyse speculation. Moreover it was necessary to be able to contrast plans and realisations.
(1981) pp. xiv–xv.
The reference is to Young (1925a).
(1975a) p. ix.
(1947c) pp. 20–2, 85; (1963a) p. 112; (1976a) p. 21.
Koot (1982) especially p. 16; see also Coase (1982) p. 33.
See also the preface to the second edition of ENSES — (1935a) p. vii, and (1932b) pp. 420–1.
(1963a) pp. 12–19.
(1935a) pp. 140–1.
(1938c) p. 646; (1971a) p. 148.
(1953b) pp. 108–9; (1970b) p. 204; Wicksteed (1910) pp. 777–8; Mises (1936) p. 115.
(1938c) p. 635; (1935a) p. 140; (1932b) pp. 420–1; see also (1934a) p. 10; (1935a) p. 141.
(1938c) p. 635.
(1935a) pp. 142–3.
(1981) p. xxiii.
(1971a) p. 147.
Lipsey (1963) p. xiii.
Baumol (1984a) p. vii.
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O’Brien, D.P. (1988). Methodology. In: Lionel Robbins. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09683-1_3
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