Fleet Renewal and Maritime Strategy in the 1980s

  • Robert S. Wood
Part of the St Antony's book series


As the United States maritime strategy was developed and articulated in the 1980s, some critics and commentators argued that it was not in fact a military strategy but a programmatic document to justify the 600-ship navy. Moreover, it was asserted, to the degree that the strategy was intended to govern the actual employment of naval forces, it was inconsistent both with nationally approved concepts of operations and war plans and with Alliance commitments.1 Although these charges were not without substance, they failed to grasp the significance of the maritime strategy in shaping national security perspectives and fleet operations.2


Nuclear Deterrent Warsaw Pact Central Front Naval Force Strategic Bomber 
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Copyright information

© John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert S. Wood

There are no affiliations available

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