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Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Massive Retaliation, 1945–60

  • Eric Grove
  • Geoffrey Till
Chapter
Part of the St Antony's book series

Abstract

For the first two decades of the post-Second World War era, strategic thinking in the navies of Britain and the United States was dominated by a number of factors, some traditional and some novel. Of the traditional ones, the geostrategic situation of the two countries was much as it had been before the Second World War. There was also the perennial problem of having to match resources with commitments, and this was complicated by the difficulty of absorbing what seemed to be a permanent revolution in naval technology.1

Keywords

Offensive Operation Naval Force Strategic Guidance Light Carrier Public Record Office 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    For a unique and well-informed survey of the way technical developments affected naval policy in the postwar period, see N. Freidman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (London, 1986).Google Scholar
  2. 7.
    Quoted in L. B. T. Ross ‘Chester William Nimitz’ in R. W. Love, Jr (ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, 1980) p. 188.Google Scholar
  3. 8.
    Quoted in D. A. Rosenberg, ‘American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organisation: The Navy Experience’, A. F. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart (eds), Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy 1978 (Washington, DC, 1979).Google Scholar
  4. 32.
    For discussion of this, se E. J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II (Annapolis, 1987) pp. 65–8.Google Scholar
  5. 33.
    The published version of the ‘Dropshot’ 1949 long-term war-plan edited by A. Case Brown under the title Operation World War II (London, 1978) p. 163.Google Scholar
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    Minister of Defence, Defence Outline of Future Policy, April 1957, CMND 124 (London, 1957), paragraph 24.Google Scholar
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    B. Ranft and G. Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (London, 1983) pp. 108–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 74.
    See the beginnings of this in ADM 205/102, notably a very prescient paper by the Controller, Sir Ralph Edwards, ‘Future Strategy’, 6 May 1954.Google Scholar
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    NSC 68: A Report of the National Security Council, reprinted in Naval War College Review, May-June 1975, p. 60.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eric Grove
  • Geoffrey Till

There are no affiliations available

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