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‘Are We Ready?’ The Development of American and British Naval Strategy, 1922–39

  • Malcolm H. Murfett
Part of the St Antony's book series

Abstract

Despite the momentous nature of the event, or perhaps because of it, the Washington Conference aroused strong emotions among naval men on both sides of the Atlantic. Many felt that it had managed to create more problems than it had solved. Apart from the dark mutterings about it being a bad bargain that ought not to have been accepted, opponents of the treaties claimed to find sufficient evidence, either in the decisions reached or those postponed, to regard the whole affair with serious misgivings.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Pearl Harbor American Foreign Policy Offensive Strategy Naval Base 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    ‘Are We Ready?’ was the title given to a survey conducted by the General Board of the US Navy on 8 August 1939, classified as General Board 425, Serial 1868, cited by J. Major, ‘The Navy Plans for War 1937–1941’ in K. J. Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History 1775–1978 (Westport, Conn., 1984) p. 247.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
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  3. 3.
    L. H. Douglas, ‘Robert Edward Coontz’ in R. W. Love Jr (ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md, 1980) pp. 23–6.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
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  6. 6.
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  7. 8.
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  10. 10.
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  11. 17.
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  12. 23.
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  20. 42.
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  25. 58.
    The Italian dimension in British strategy is well covered by L. R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez (Cambridge, 1975)Google Scholar
  26. 60.
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  27. 79.
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  28. 80.
    The pioneering work of Rear-Admiral W. A. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, is best described by J. J. Clark in his book, Carrier Admiral (New York, 1967)Google Scholar
  29. and the early phase of carrier development is most persuasively discussed by C. M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier 1911–29 (Annapolis, 1974).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Malcolm H. Murfett

There are no affiliations available

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