Abstract
The claim that human beings are endowed with innate knowledge of one kind or another is an ancient one. Although for many philosophers the thesis of innate knowledge was laid to rest by Locke’s critique in this regard, in recent years attention has shifted to a consideration of Noam Chomsky’s neo-Cartesian rationalism in cognitive psychology, arising out of his investigations into syntax.1
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Notes
Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (Harper & Row, 1966);
Chomsky, Language and Mind (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), and
Chomsky, Reflections on Language (Pantheon Books; Random House, 1975).
Noam Chomsky, ‘Linguistics and Philosophy’ in Sidney Hook (ed.), Language and Philosophy: A Symposium (New York University Press, 1969) p. 88.
John Searle, ‘The Rules of the Language-Game’, Times Literary Supplement, September 10, 1976.
Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (M.I.T. Press, 1965) p. 27.
Gilbert Ryle, ‘ Mowgli in Babel’, Philosophy: Journal of the Royal Philosophical Society, Vol. 49, No. 187, January 1974, pp. 9–10.
Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding Vol. 1: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton University Press, 1972), chapter 7: ‘The Apparent Invariants of Thought and Language’.
Karl Popper, ‘What is Dialectic?’ in his Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
See Noam Chomsky, ‘A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior’, Language, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1959) pp. 26–58.
Reprinted in J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (eds.), The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Prentice-Hall, 1964) pp. 547–78.
A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (Basil Blackwell, 1966) p. 56.
Noam Chomsky, ‘Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language’ in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (St. Martin’s Press, N.Y., 1969) p. 277.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Harper Colophon ed., 1965) p. 119 et seq.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; Basil Blackwell, 1968) para. 160.
Paul Feyerabend, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’ in K. T. Fann (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and his Philosophy (Dell Publishing Co., 1967) p. 224, note 9.
For this rendering of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘criterion’, I am relying on what I consider to be the best account by far: P. M. S. Hacker’s ‘The Problem of Criteria’, chapter 10 of his Insight and Illusion (Oxford University Press, 1975).
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© 1979 Jeff Coulter
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Coulter, J. (1979). Deleting the Subject. In: The Social Construction of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09379-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09379-3_4
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