Abstract
By the late sixties the relative calm in relations between workers and employers in Sweden was breaking down. Relative deprivation was increasing, less as a consequence of stagnation in incomes and rising unemployment, but more as a consequence of the very policies that the unions had themselves pursued which had entailed very high rates of mobility and consequent disruption to patterns of life. By the mid-seventies this sense of disillusionment and relative deprivation was intensified when the Swedish economy began to go into recession. Commitment to full employment delayed the impact of the world recession for some time but ultimately real incomes began to fall and the more so as a result of the commitment to full employment.
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Notes and References
Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 210.; Martin (1978), p. 109.
Martin (1978), p. 109.
Anderman (1967), p. 211.
Anderman (1967), p. 211.
Martin (1976, 1978).
Korpi (1983), p.51.
Anderman (1967), p. 257.
Martin (1978), p. 12.; Hancock (1979), p. 324.
Helenius (1969), p. 215.
Elvander (1974).
Rosenblum (1980), p.280.
Martin (1978), p. 110; Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 219; Korpi (1978b), p. 324; Stephens (1979), p. 14; Esping-Anderson and Friedland (1982).
Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 220.
Hufford (1973), p. 28; Ohlin (1974), p. 136.
Hancock (1979), p. 326.
Thimm (1979), p. 156.
Thimm (1979), p. 157.
The fact that the white-collar union federation, TCO, had also called for greater industrial democracy and were in broad agreement with LO on the issue made it a particularly powerful demand which the Social Democrats could not ignore.
For a summary see Landsorganisationen (1979).
Himmelstrand et al (1981), p. 270.
Landsorganisationen (1979), p. 11.
For details see Landsorganisationen (1979), pp. 12–15 and Choate (1979).
For details see Martin (1976); LO (1979), pp. 18–19.; Broström (1982).
Martin (1979); Landsorganisationen (1979), pp. 20–24.; Thimm (1979), pp. 161–64. For an interpretation of the form of co-determination in Sweden compared to other countries see Stephens and Stephens (1983).
Forsell (1971).
Korpi (1983), p. 138.
Lindbeck (1975), p.27.
Otter et al (1982), p. 17; Heclo (1974), p. 249; Ohlin (1974), p. 139.
Childs (1980), p. 57. For the historical background to the idea of wage-earner funds see Eidem and Öhman (n.d.). This is a translation of the first section of a ‘study report’ of the Commission on Wage-Earners’ Funds and Capital Formation, entitled Löntagarfonder: Bakgrund, Problem och Möjligheter. See also Meidner (1978b). This is a translation of the essential part of the revised report adopted by the LO Congress in 1976, Kollektiv Kapitalbildning Genom Löntagarfonder.
Korpi (1983), p. 139.
Meidner (1978a).
Asard (1980), p. 378.
The original report of 1975 was entitled Löntagarfonder.
Åsard (1980), p. 378. Others argue that it is hardly credible that Meidner was motivated solely by the desire to solve the problems arising from the solidaristic wage policy question but that this masked a real concern for the issue of power and control in industry. Such a view was expressed by Berndt Öhman, Chairman of the Commission on Wage-Earner Funds, to the author in a personal interview in Stockholm, September 1982. Even if this were true the fact remains that it was presented at the time as a solution to the wage solidarity problem and rather differently later on.
Meidner (1980).
Meidner (1980), pp. 353–54.
Meidner (1980), p. 357.
Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 226.
Lindbeck, for example, said the funds were a ‘death sentence for pluralism’ and referred to the nightmarish society they would, in his view, create as ‘Meidnerland’. Quoted in Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 243.
Åsard (1980), p. 378, who rather overstates, however, the differences between the 1975 and 1976 versions.
Meidner et al (1977), p. 243.
Berndt Öhman also expressed the view that it was Meidner’s personal contribution that shaped the proposals in the radical way that emerged in 1975 and that they were not necessary to solve the problems he had been asked to investigate. Whatever might be the truth of this claim the fact
that LO adopted his ideas in 1976 so enthusiastically demonstrates the radical tendencies that had emerged within the union movement by this time.
For details see Eidem and Öhman (n.d.), pp. 45–46.
Johansson (1982)
Programme of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, 1975, translated by R. G. Tanner.
Programme of the Swedish Social Social Democratic Party, 1975, p. 17.
Sainsbury (1981), p.288.
The Liberals supported the government in this in return for agreement on certain changes in the taxation system.
Korpi (1983), p. 139.
For a discussion the various views see Stephens (1981b); Elder (1979). The latter believes that rather than votes being lost due to the radicalisation of policy, a secular decline was not held in check mainly because of rising inflation rates.
Petersson (1978). Korpi challenges the argument that embourgeoisement has produced a long-term decline in support for the Social Democrats pointing out that this was at its highest in the affluent sixties. Korpi (1978a).
A survey carried out by the conservative paper Svenska Dagblad showed that two thirds of voters were against the funds and one half of LO members were against them. Kelman (1977)
Sarlvik (1977), p. 123.
Kelman (1977); Elvander (1979), p. 28; Asard (1980), pp. 379–80.
On the contradictory nature of the fund proposals as far as class support is concerned see Madsen (1980).
Korpi (1978b), (1983), pp. 143–44; Stephens (1981).
Madsen (1980), p. 282.
Elvander (1979), p. 28.
For a criticism of this type see Meyerson (1979).
Einhorn and Logue (1980). Wage restraint has, in Denmark, been stated as the price that the unions would have to pay to get the funds. This element has not been absent from the argument in Sweden as Einhorn and Logue report. See also Öhman (1982), pp. 221–29.
Apple, Higgins and Wright (1981), p. 243.
Landsorganisationen (1982), pp. 12–13.
For a discussion of the proposals see Himmelstrand et al (1981), pp. 263–68.
The secretary of the official commision at the time, Berndt Öhman has since said that he was forbidden to write or comment on the issue of power and control by the Chairman, Hjalmar Mehr and members of the government, before the official report was issued. Interview Stockholm, September, 1982.
Himmelstrand et al (1981), p. 264.
Asard (1980), pp. 385–84.
For a summary see Öhman (1979) and Skog (1981).
Åsard (1981), pp. 384–85.
Korpi (1983), p. 144.
Rosenblum (1980), pp. 275–76.
Höglund (1982), p.4.
Otter and Soder (1981).
Leijon (n.d.), p. 12.
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© 1989 Malcolm B. Hamilton
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Hamilton, M.B. (1989). The Radicalisation of Functional Socialism 1968–80. In: Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden. University of Reading European and International Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09234-5_10
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