For a NATO Defensive Deterrent

Abstract

This essay proposes that NATO should adopt, in a gradual and orderly fashion, a grand strategy and accompanying posture distinctly different from its present one. The strategy I recommend has variously been termed ‘non-provocative defence’, ‘defence-only defence’, or ‘defensive deterrence’, I shall employ the latter term here. By it I mean a militarily sound strategy relying solely on conventional weapons so long as the enemy uses only conventional weapons, and a posture that is unambiguously capable only of defence. Secure, second-strike nuclear forces would be retained for deterrence of any nuclear use by the opponent. This goal is consistent with the goal stated in Frank Barnaby’s companion paper in this volume; here however I shall lay the emphasis on political and politico-military rationales for a defensive deterrent. The paper begins with two brief arguments why a shift in NATO strategy is needed, advances some distinctions among the possible alternatives, and then presents some seven rationales for its recommended policy.