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A Game-theoretic Analysis of the Role of the Arms Industry in the International Security System

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Abstract

The arms industry represents both a major sector of the economy and a pivotal component in the national security system of all major nuclear weapons states, including the two superpowers of the USA and the Soviet Union and the other three major powers of the UK, France and China. The importance of the arms industry has been recognised by both statesmen and analysts. An early and still important example is President Eisenhower’s famous farewell address in which he warned of the potential dangers of the military-industrial complex in the US. Economists have studied the weapons acquisition process in both the US and the Soviet Union using the tools of industrial organisation, macroeconomic analysis and political analysis, demonstrating the size, importance and complexity of the arms industry.1

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© 1987 International Economic Association

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Intriligator, M.D., Brito, D.L. (1987). A Game-theoretic Analysis of the Role of the Arms Industry in the International Security System. In: Borner, S., Taylor, A. (eds) Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World Development. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09117-1_15

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