Abstract
The US commitment to use nuclear weapons in the defence of Western Europe represents the central military feature of the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time uncertainty about that commitment is the primary source of divisiveness and recurring strain among Alliance members. Acutely aware of their dependence on the US commitment, the Europeans are in constant need of reassurance. But dependence itself has not provided a strong enough motivation for the Alliance to embrace alternatives. As a result, the history of nuclear weapons in NATO is one of a constant struggle to maintain the credibility of deterrence and to assuage the concerns of America’s European partners. As Michael Howard puts it:
The American military presence [is] wanted in Western Europe, not just in the negative role of a deterrent to Soviet aggression but in the positive role of a reassurance to the West Europeans; the kind of reassurance a child needs from its parents or an invalid from his doctors against dangers which, however remote, cannot be entirely discounted.1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, ‘Greater Flexibility for NATO’S Flexible Response’, Strategic Review, Spring 1983, pp. 11–19; Anthony H. Cordesman, Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I: American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence, Adelphi Paper no. 175 (London: IISS, 1982)
J. Michael Legge, Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1983), R-2964-FF.
Quoted in Stanley R. Sloan, NATO’S Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 1985), p. 24.
Useful discussions and analyses of new technologies and their relationship to operational doctrines are contained in: Report of the European Security Study, Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe — Proposals for the 1980s (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983); New Technology and Western Security Policy, Adelphi Papers nos 197–199 (London: IISS, 1985)
Roger L. Facer, Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response: Issues and Approaches (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1985), R-3209-FF.
Discussed in David M. Abshire, NATO on the Move (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 1985), Alliance Papers no. 6.
Editor information
Copyright information
© 1986 International Institute for Strategic Studies
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sloss, L. (1986). The Roles of Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy: Part II. In: O’neill, R. (eds) Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control. International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Papers. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08824-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08824-9_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-08826-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-08824-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)