The Roles of Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy: Part I

Abstract

It is no secret that NATO’s strategy is one of Flexible Response, but to understand the benefits of that strategy, and to identify some of the possible weaknesses in it, it is necessary to consider briefly the genesis of the strategy. The primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty since its inception has been the prevention of war of any kind in the treaty area, and to achieve this the Alliance has adopted a strategy of deterrence. From the outset, the corner-stone of that strategy has been the US arsenal of nuclear weapons, and the commitment by successive US Administrations to engage in nuclear warfare on NATO’s behalf if the integrity of NATO territory could not be restored in any other way. While the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority in every class of weapon, the commitment was wholly credible and the deterrent strategy could rest almost solely on the threat to employ nuclear weapons at a very early stage of conflict and in a massive way. The strategy of ‘trip-wire’ and ‘massive retaliation’ also had the advantage of being remarkably cheap and as such was also addictive. The logic that underlay the strategy — simplistic by today’s standards — was based on the nostrum that if large standing armies could not be maintained in Western Europe to counter the still numerous Soviet Forces, then nuclear weapons with their awesome destructive power would fill the gap.