Abstract
Even at the risk of straying from the given subject, it must be pointed out right away why the national operational priorities of the NATO countries are considerably less important than their national political and strategic priorities. Definitive decisions made at these higher levels determine the interpretation of NATO doctrine and condition the operational choices made in view of its implementation. This applies to the fixing of budgetary priorities, levels and composition of forces, and especially to the importance attributed to the tasks of NATO defence in Europe compared with other national objectives and requirements.
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Notes
General Sir Nigel Bagnall, ‘Concepts of Land/Air Operations in the Central Region’, RUSI Journal, September 1984, vol. 129, no. 3, pp. 59–62.
Ibid; see also General Leopold Chalupa, The Defence of Central Europe: Implications of Change’, RUSI Journal, March 1985, vol. 130, no. 1, pp. 13–17.
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© 1986 International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Stratmann, P. (1986). NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks: Part II. In: O’neill, R. (eds) Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control. International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Papers. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08824-9_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08824-9_14
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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