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Arms-control Implications of NATO and Warsaw Pact Doctrines

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Abstract

Soviet military doctrine for war in the European theatre has evolved in some important ways over the last two decades. The basic scenarios used for military planning have undergone revision. The expectations about the inevitability of escalation from non-nuclear to nuclear warfare have been modified. A clear-cut preference for extending the non-nuclear phase of conflict — and perhaps even keeping theatre wars ‘conventional’ — has emerged.

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Notes

  1. The best work on the subject is Stephen M. Meyer’s Adelphi Papers nos 187 & 188, Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces: Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives and Part II: Capabilities and Implications (London: IISS, Winter 1983/4).

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  2. S.A. Tyushkevitch, et. al., Soviet Armed Forces: History and Development (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), p. 476.

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  3. Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major General Cherednichenko, ‘Military Strategy and Its Problems’, Voennaya Mysl’ 1968, no. 10, in Selected Readings from Soviet Military Thought 1959–1973, SPC Report 584 (Arlington, VA: Systems Planning Corporation, 1980), p. 383.

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  4. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, ‘Military Strategy’, Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), vol. 7, pp. 555–65.

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  5. Colonel-General M. Gareyev, The Views of M. V. Frunze and Contemporary Military Theory (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 240.

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  6. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 89.

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  7. Quoted in William F. Scott (ed.), Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970–1975 (Washington DC: uSGPO, 1977), p. 209.

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  8. See Henry Kissinger’s discussion of his exchanges with the Soviet leaders on this point. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1982), p. 277.

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  9. See Stephen Meyer, ‘Soviet Perspective on the Paths to War’, in G. Allison, A. Carnesale, J. Nye (ed.), Hawks, Doves, & Owls (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 188.

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Authors

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Robert O’neill

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© 1986 International Institute for Strategic Studies

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Ross, D. (1986). Arms-control Implications of NATO and Warsaw Pact Doctrines. In: O’neill, R. (eds) Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control. International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Papers. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08824-9_10

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