The Commission was born amid confident predictions that its financial future was assured. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the Second Reading Debate on the Transport Bill, had pointed out the benefit that would result from the use of government credit; refinancing the whole of public transport on a 2.5 per cent basis would yield a bonus, compared with the interest burdens on the railways and London Transport before nationalisation.1 Taking over the generally profitable road haulage industry — agaain on a 2.5 per cent basis — must also be good business. Furthermore, unification of the railways was expected to yield substantial working economies. The elimination of ‘wasteful competition’ between road and rail would be another major source of savings.
KeywordsCentral Charge Principal Activity Historic Cost Deficit Balance General Investment
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Notes and References
- 1.Hansard, 17 December 1946, Col. 1810–11. However, interest rates were rising during 1947 and by November of that year the gilt-edged rate was 3 per cent.Google Scholar
- 2.Harold Wilson, The Finance of Railway Nationalisation (unpublished) Railway Clerks Association (1945).Google Scholar
- 3.BTC AR 1948, p. 196.Google Scholar
- 4.Ibid., p. 193.Google Scholar
- 5.Ibid., p. 40.Google Scholar
- 6.In the submission of a freight charging scheme to the Transport Tribunal in 1956.Google Scholar
- 7.In an unpublished study by W. P. Parker, British Railways Financial Performance and Government Policy, 1948 to 1975 (City of London Polytechnic).Google Scholar
- 8.BTC AR 1951, pp. 50–52.Google Scholar
- 9.H. Wilson, The Financial Problem of British Transport (unpublished) (TSSA, NUR and ASLEF 1951) p. 22.Google Scholar