Abstract
Compliance with any treaty is a major indicator of trust and confidence in the relations among states. Challenging the compliance of a treaty partner in public may serve either as a severe warning based on firm evidence or as a public posture to justify a potential future abandonment of a specific treaty. The verification of the ABM Treaty is based on national technical means, for example on the analysis of satellite intelligence. In February 1978 in a report to Congress Secretary of State Vance referred to the following compliance issues relating to the ABM Treaty: (1) installation of a new ABM test range in Kamchatka; (2) SA-5 radar tests ‘in an ABM mode’ and (3) mobile ABMs. Obviously all three compliance issues could be discussed and solved in the context of the Standing Consultative Comission (SCC).1
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Notes
Mark M. Lowenthal, Verification: Soviet Compliance With Arms Control Agreements (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1985) p. 2.
Jeanette Voas, The President’s Report on Soviet Non-compliance With Arms Control Agreements: A Discussion of the Charges, Report 84–160F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 September 1984.
John Pike and Jonathan Rich, ‘Charges of Treaty Violations Much Less Than Meets the Eye’, FAS Public Interest Report 37 (March 1984) pp. 1–20.
John B. Rhinelander, ‘How to Save the ABM Treaty’ Arms Control Today 15 (May 1985) pp. 1; 5–9.
Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact of US and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985).
Thomas K. Longstreth and John E. Pike, ‘US, Soviet programs threaten ABM Treaty’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41 (April 1985) p. 11.
See John B. Rhinelander, ‘Reagan’s “Exotic” Interpretation of the ABM Treaty — Legally, Historically, and Factually Wrong’, Arms Control Today 15 (October 1985) pp. 3–6; Ambassador Nitze and Mr Sofaer, ‘The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program’, Current Policy 755 (Washington DC: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1985).
See Jeanette Voas, ‘The arms-control compliance debate’, Survival 28, (January/February 1986) pp. 8–31; The President’s Report to the Congress on Soviet Non-Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, 23 January 1984, US House Doc. 98–158 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984); ‘The President’s Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements’, 1 February 1985, in Congressional Record, 5 March 1985, vol. 131, pp. S2530–2534; ‘The President’s Unclassified Report on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements’, White House Press Release, 23 December 1985;
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, ‘A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments, 1958–1983’, Congressional Record, 11 October 1984, vol. 130, pp. S14526–S14529.
Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR). A phased array radar (PAR) is a radar that points its beam in different directions without moving the antenna mechanically. PARs can track many targets simultaneously, a critical function for any radar that would be used in an ABM role. Merrill I. Skolnik, Introduction to Radar Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980);
Eli Brookner, ‘Phased Array Radar’, Scientific American 252 (1984) pp. 94–102.
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1972) pp. 197–204;
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1972).
See for details on the problem of distinguishing the trajectories of SLBM and tactical ballistic missiles, Stephen Weiner, ‘Systems and Technology’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984) pp. 73–5.
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Part 6 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 2956.
US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Part 5 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 242.
Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact of US and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty (Washington DC: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985) p. 74.
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© 1987 Hans Günter Brauch
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Longstreth, T.K., Pike, J.E., Rhinelander, J.B. (1987). Compliance With the ABM Treaty — Questions Related to Soviet Missile Defence Activities and to the United States SDI. In: Brauch, H.G. (eds) Star Wars and European Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08615-3_16
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