Abstract
At the Bonn Economic Summit in May 1985, when President Francois Mitterrand issued his famous refusal to the United States invitation to participate in SDI research,1 he made it clear that it was not the idea of building military systems in space to which France was objecting but rather to the prospects of becoming what he called ‘subcontractors’ to the United States in such a venture.2
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Notes
For more details see David Yost, France’s Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe. Part I: Capabilities and Doctrine, Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984/1985); Yost, Part II: Strategic and Arms Control Implications, Adelphi Paper 195 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985).
See WEU, Standing Armaments Committee, The Armaments Industry in the WEU member countries (Paris: Western European Union, 1982).
See Michel Cordelle, ‘La détection magnétique des sous-marins, Acte du colloque’, Science et Défense (Paris: Ministry of Defence 1983).
Pierre Gallois, La guerre des cents secondes (Paris: Fayard, 1985) pp. 102–3.
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© 1987 Hans Günter Brauch
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Carton, A. (1987). The Implications of SDI for French Defence Policy. In: Brauch, H.G. (eds) Star Wars and European Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08615-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08615-3_12
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