Abstract
Söderström’s paper is an original and valuable contribution to the interesting and, in my opinion, highly relevant problem of whether or not and to what extent a nonaccommodation policy is an optimal government strategy in the presence of centralized wage setting and external shocks. The author forcefully stresses the benefits of gradualism, thereby dismissing the “all or nothing” choice that usually governs the literature on the accommodation problem.
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De Bruyne, G., Phelps, E. (1986). Comment on H. Tson Söderström,“Union Militancy, External Shocks and the Accommodation Dilemma”. In: Calmfors, L., Horn, H. (eds) Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08596-5_13
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