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Abstract

British speculation about possible conflict between the major powers has long been dominated by two fundamental questions — what form might such conflict take, and how likely is it to occur in the foreseeable future. In the era of total war, a tendency developed to consider these questions independently of one another, as if the primarily military problem of what might happen once hostilities began had only limited relation to the primarily political issue of how likely war was to be declared in the first place. However, since the advent of thermonuclear weapons, it is arguable that the likelihood and nature of conflict have become inextricably interlinked, with limited antagonism over a specific political issue being far more likely than a sudden slide into all-out hostilities, and with only the uncertainty and passion associated with any use of military force serving to shore up the once clear-cut distinction between war and peace. In this new situation, it would in many ways appear sensible to abjure separate discussion of the likelihood and nature of East/West hostilities, and instead to ask the single question of what type of conflict the competing blocs are most likely to pursue.

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Notes and References

  1. L. Martin, ‘The Utility of Military Force’, in Adelphi Paper 102 (1973) p. 14.

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  2. See J. Barry, ‘How NATO’s nuclear planning elite has tied its own hands’, The Times, 19 August 1981.

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  3. See H. Young, ‘CND and the perils of nuclear secrecy’, The Sunday Times, 1 November 1981.

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  4. This argument is made in much fuller form in my article ‘Reassurance, Consensus, and Controversy: The Domestic Dilemmas of European Defence’, in S. Flanagan and F. Hampson (eds), Securing Europe’s Future (Croom Helm, 1986).

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  5. The surprising amount of hard data now available on the Soviet Union is pointed out in L. H. Gelb, ‘What we really know about Russia’, New York Times Magazine, 28 October 1984.

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© 1986 Philip A. G. Sabin

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Sabin, P.A.G. (1986). Conclusion. In: The Third World War Scare in Britain. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08521-7_7

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