The Assessment and Acceptance of Intelligence: a Case-Study

Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine the assessment and acceptance of intelligence in Britain in relation to two wars of very different scale and duration, namely World War II and the Falklands War of 1982. Although the latter, which is treated in Section II, is incommensurable with the former, it has been chosen because the subsequent enquiry, conducted by Lord Franks,¹ throws a rare shaft of light on the field of intelligence, which in Britain is normally shrouded in darkness. Since the range of Franks’ scrutiny was limited, the present author has extended it backwards by drawing upon his experience of an earlier and lesser crisis in Anglo-Argentine relations (1951–52).² The purpose of this is to clarify, if possible, some of the issues facing those responsible in Whitehall for assessing the intelligence available at that, and at the later, periods.