Abstract
One of the long-range planning tools that came into its own during the 1970s is scenario-planning. Scenarios present several starkly contrasting futures, none of which is ‘right’, but which force executives to think of economic and business possibilities and break through executives’ traditional attitudes. The theory behind scenario-planning is that, if executives are prepared for several unconventional outcomes, they will be ready to cope with the real world, whatever it might be. In ‘pure’ scenario development, no probabilities are attached to the various outcomes, because to do so would mean attaching probabilities to ‘unknowledge’. Also, it could encourage too much focusing on high-probability scenarios and too little on low-probability ones.
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References
‘In This Issue’, Challenge, July–August 1985, p. 2.
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Said during a work session, Paris, October 1979: The author was involved, in one form or another, with Shell planning-in The Hague, July 1976; in Paris, October 1979; London, April 1982, and through frequent visits to Shell Centre in the period September 1983–May 1984. In 1982–3 he was also involved with one of Shell’s American joint ventures and was, in this instance, a user of Shell’s central scenarios.
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Benard, ‘World Oil and Cold Reality’, presented two scenarios, ‘The World of Internal Contradictions’ and ‘Restructured Growth’.
A draft note for discussion, no author, date, or place; mimeographed. Private communication to the author, 1980.
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In fact, most companies do avoid scenarios. See H. E. Klein and R. E. Linneman, ‘The Use of Scenarios in Corporate Planning’, Long Range Planning, 1981, no. 5, pp. 69–77. For a view maintaining that this is a mistake,
see Gerald Meyers (former CEO of American Motors), ‘Teaching Managers to Handle Crises’, New York Times, 3 August 1985.
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Grayson, L.E. (1987). Scenario-Planning. In: Who and How in Planning for Large Companies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08412-8_2
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