Abstract
Richard Nixon had few ambivalences about the Third World. Unlike Eisenhower or Kennedy, Nixon was never attracted to the idea of a modus vivendi with radical nationalisms. Nor was his National Security Adviser (later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger. For them, simple repression was the appropriate US response to currents of Third World change.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
US Congress, House Subcommittee on the Near East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, 92nd Congress, 2nd session, 1972, p. 95.
Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s. A New Strategy for Peace, report to the Congress, 18 February 1970, p. 6.
Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, Building for Peace, report to the Congress, 25 February 1971, p. 14.
Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s. The Emerging Structure of Peace, report to the Congress, 9 February 1972, p. 153
Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s. Shaping a Durable Peace, report to the Congress, 3 May 1973, p. 39
memorandum by Henry Kissinger, ‘Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975’, 9 November 1970, National Security Study Memorandum 104
memorandum by Kissinger, ‘Follow-on Study of Strategy Toward Indian Ocean’, 22 December 1970, National Security Study Memorandum 110.
For a good summary of the conclusions of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean studies, and of the reasoning which went into them, see the July 1971 Congressional testimony by Ronald Spiers (director, State Department bureau of politico-military affairs) and Robert Pranger (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs) in US Congress, House Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, 92nd Congress, 1st session, 1971, pp. 161–94. For the best secondary treatment of US policy in the Nixon years, written with first hand knowledge, see Gary Sick, ‘The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions’, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New York: Praeger, 1983).
The words are those of Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. See US Congress, House Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: the Continuing Debate on Arms Sales, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, p. 6.
See statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, in US Congress, House Subcommitte on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973, p. 39
see also US Congress, House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Persian Gulf 1974: Money, Politics, Arms, and Power, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, p. 73
See statement of Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, in US Congress, The Persian Gulf, 1914, p. 73.
Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 140.
Ibid., pp. 146–7.
Ibid., pp. 138–47.
Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, pp. 154–61; Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton University Press, 1982) pp. 142–54.
Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, pp. 176–81.
US, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, December 1980, pp. 1–2.
US, Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, pp. 134–5;
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979) p. 1264; Pierre, Global Arms Sales, p. 145; New York Times, 25 July 1971, pp. 2, 3.
David M. Abshire (Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations) to Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind), 17 December 1971, printed in US, Congress, U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, pp. 153–4.
The administration position is stated in US, Congress, House Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, p.96.
Ibid., p. 27; also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1264.
US, Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf pp. 26–45; Pierre, Global Arms Sales, pp. 175–88.
US, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, December 1980, pp. 1–2.
Pierre, Global Arms Sales, p. 182.
US, Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, pp. 76–8, 131.
Pierre, Global Arms Sales, p. 187; Marie-Christine Aulas, ‘La Diplomatique Saoudienne à L’Épreuve’, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1977, pp. 2–3,
George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 649–50.
In 1971, three exercises were conducted in Indian Ocean waters — in April, a six-ship anti-submarine warfare exercise in the eastern Indian Ocean near Australia; in July, a non-stop transit from Singapore to Australia via the Seychelles by the nuclear-powered frigate Truxton; and in September, an exercise involving the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise (at that time the only operational nuclear carrier) and the nuclear frigate Bainbridge in the eastern Indian Ocean around Indonesia. Finally, in December 1971, a carrier task force led by the Enterprise was sent into the Bay of Bengal as evidence of the US ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War. US, Congress, U.S. Interests in and Policy toward the Persian Gulf, p. 111.
New York Times, 30 September 1971, p. 9; New York Times, 11 October 1971, p. 1; New York Times, 4 November 1971, p. 4; New York Times, 8 January 1972, p. 10.
New York Times, 3 April 1969, p. 34; New York Times, 23 August 1969, p. 1; New York Times, 22 August 1970, p.4; New York Times, 27 September 1971, p. 16; New York Times, 11 October 1971, p. 1.
Sick, ‘Evolution of U.S. Strategy’, pp. 57–62; Elmo Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1976) pp. 360–3 (quote on p. 363); New York Times, 28 November 1970, p. 2.
Sick, ‘Evolution of U.S. Strategy’, pp. 63–4.
Ibid.; Stephen S. Roberts, ‘The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War’, in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (eds), Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p.207;
New York Times, 1 December 1973, p. 5; US, Congress, House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, p. 25.
US, Congress, Proposed Expansion, pp. 151, 167; US, Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Selected Material on Diego Garcia, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, pp. 4–5;
US, Congress, House Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, Diego Garcia, 1975: The Debate over the Base and the Island’s Former Inhabitants, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, p. 7;
US, Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Construction Authorization, FY 1975, Senate Report 93–1136 accompanying HR 16136, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, p. 7;
Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st session, 6 November 1975, 121: 35340–54.The administration had been rebuffed in initial attempts to fund the logistical facility approved by Clark Clifford in 1968. In Fiscal Year 1970 (calendar year 1969), the Navy approached Congress with a request for the first increment of construction money to build the base. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee approved the proposal, but the Senate refused to follow suit. Richard B. Russell, powerful chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, opposed the base, as did members of the Subcommittee on Military Construction. A compromise was reached in conference: the Navy would present another proposal in Fiscal Year 1971 for money to construct a communications facility; all funds for the support facility would be deleted. Accordingly, in Fiscal Year 1971, the Congress authorised $20.45 million for building a ‘limited communications station’ on Diego Garcia; $5.4 million was appropriated to start work. Since none of the policy reviews of 1969 and 1970 posited need for an expanded base, the matter was let drop over the next several years.
US, Congress, Proposed Expansion, pp. 167–8; James R. Schlesinger to John C. Stennis (Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee) 16 February 1974, printed in US, Congress, Selected Material on Diego Garcia, pp. 12–13 (quote); US, Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Military Construction, Second Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 2115, 2138, 2140–2; US, Congress, House Subcommittee on Military Construction, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, FY 1974, p. 55.
Administration spokesmen played down strategic options the base might afford in the Indian Ocean littoral. In their words, it would ‘provide support for a flexible range of activities, including maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and enhanced communications’, relieving the ‘strain’ of supporting naval operations thousands of miles from the nearest base. It would be ‘a super filling station’ where the fleet could pick up the ‘windshield wipers, and the tires, and whatnot that a filling station provides’. Why the fleet might need this filling station was not specified in great detail. Nor was the meaning of the phrase ‘aircraft staging’. Without an expanded runway, the base was able to accommodate all Navy and Air Force aircraft but the KC-135 tanker and the B-52 bomber. With the 4000 foot extension (from 8000 to 12000 feet) it could accommodate the KC-135 tanker — which could refuel B-52s. The expense of the purported filling station was understated along with the uses. The FY 1974 supplemental budget contained $29 million to fund construction; further costs would add (supposedly) $8.3 million to the final bill. Under Congressional prodding, however, the fact emerged that the total planned expenditure was really $137.2 million: the Navy had neglected to mention the salaries of Seabees who were building the base or the cost of communications equipment and other machinery which would be installed there. See US, Congress, Proposed Expansion, pp. 54, 167–8; US, Congress, House Subcommittee on Military Construction, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, FY 1974, part 1, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, pp.61, 74–5, 78; US, Congress, Diego Garcia, 1975, pp. 8–9, 28–9.
US, Congress, The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 176.
US, Congress, U. S. Interests in and Policy toward the Persian Gulf, p. 2.
US, Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 2119.
US, Congress, Proposed Expansion, p. 34.
Ibid., pp.27–8.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p.625.
Ibid., p. 1036.
Ibid., p.626.
Ibid.
See statement in Kissinger news conference at Jerusalem, 17 June 1974, in The Department of State Bulletin 71, 1829 (15 July 1974): 125.
In his 17 September news conference in Cincinnati, Kissinger declared, The U.S. preference prior to Rabat had been that the issue should be settled in negotiation between Jordan and Israel. That was the position we supported, and that is still basically our preference.’ The Department of State Bulletin 73, 1893 (6 October 1975): 510.
Ibid.
These documents are printed in US, Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Search for Peace in the Middle East, 1967–79, pp.93, 97, 101.
US, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, September 1983, p. 10.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1986 William Stivers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stivers, W. (1986). Nixon and his Doctrine. In: America’s Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948–83. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08398-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08398-5_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-08400-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-08398-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)