Abstract
The Eisenhower years marked the beginning of direct US activism in the Middle East. In the eyes of US policy makers in the 1950s, the Western oil interest was too vital for Washington to abandon to uncertainty. Nationalist forces were rising in the region — and though not simple handmaidens of the Soviet Union, were steeped in antagonism toward the West. One of the chief causes for this antagonism was the US commitment to Israel — a signal undertaking of the previous Administration. Eisenhower was left the task of trying to reconcile that commitment with the need to still Arab discontent. At the same time, the irreversible decline of British power created a political and military void that only the United States could fill.
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Notes and References
Report prepared by State Department Office of Intelligence Research, ‘The British Position in the Middle East’, 2 October 1952, DDRS, (78) 415A.
Ibid.
State Department briefing for the president, ‘Bermuda Meeting — December 4–6, 1953: Memorandum on Relative U.S.-U.K. Roles in the Middle East’, 27 November 1953, DDRS, (77) 237E.
Memorandum of conversation with the president, 21 November 1956, DDRS, (78) 451A.
For a description of the proposed functioning of the Middle East Command, see negotiating paper by steering group on preparations for talks between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, ‘Middle East Command’, 4 January 1952, DDRS, (77) 67E.
[State Department?] memorandum to Eisenhower, ‘Defense of the Middle East’, [July?] 1955, DDRS, (78) 283A; Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘U.K. Views Regarding the Middle East’, JSPC 883/78, 11 August 1955, DDRS, (78) 366A; memorandum by Office of Foreign Military Affairs (Department of Defense) to Eisenhower, ‘Middle East Areas’, 5 May 1955, DDRS, (81) 37A (quote); Note by JCS Secretariat to holders of JCS 1887/117, 7 December 1955, DDRS, (78) 367A; Report by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’, Baghdad Pact Planning Staff Study …’ JCS 1887/302, DDRS, (78) 367A.
JSPC 883/78, see note 6 above; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, ‘Logistic Support of Our Strategy in the Middle East’, 12 August 1955, DDRS, (78) 367B.
[State Department?] memorandum to Eisenhower, DDRS, (78) 283A, note 6 above; Eden talks, Washington, 30 January–1 February 1956, memorandum of conversation, 30 January 1956, DDRS, (78) 283B; memorandum of conversation with the president, 20 December 1956, DDRS, (81) 391B.
See JCS comments on Iraq in memorandum, ‘Logistic Support of our Strategy in the Middle East’, note 7 above; see also Dulles’s remarks on the ‘unstable and weak situation in Iraq’ in State Department memorandum of conversation with the president, 15 June 1958, DDRS, (81) 371B. The State Department intelligence report, note 1 above, adverted to a shift of power from the ‘feudal oligarchy’ to an ‘emerging middle sector’ of Iraqi society, which had grown with the spread of secular education and urbanisation. This shift, the report asserted, was ‘part of a broad historical process, encouraged by factors which are integral to social and economic development’.
Eden talks, memorandum of conversation, 30 January 1956, note 8 above.
Ibid. ; Eisenhower staff notes no. 62, 9 January 1957, DDRS, (79) 219C; Department of State memorandum of conversation with King Hussein, 25 March 1959, DDRS, (79) 196A; National Security Council Memorandum, ‘U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, 17 June 1960, NSC 6011.
Memorandum of conference with the president, 24 July 1958, DDRS, (77) 355A.
John Foster Dulles, memorandum of conversation, 21 October 1955, DDRS (81) 217D.
See note 3 above.
Robert H. Ferrell (ed.) The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981) p. 318.
US Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents (Washington, DCUSGPO, 1957): 2176–80.
For a treatment of the Anderson Mission, see Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), pp. 130–6, 168–9; see also Eisenhower diary entries for 11 January and 13 March 1956, in Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 307–8, 318–19.
NSC 6011, see note 11 above.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington: USGPO, 1958): 13–14.
‘The Middle East Resolution, approved March 9, 1957’, in US, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, pp. 216–18.
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957: 1023–8.
Briefing sheet prepared by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee for the Joint Chiefs of Staff special meeting, 18 February 1957, DDRS, (79) 375A (quote); report by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Military Action in Relation to the Jordanian Situation’, 19 February 1957, DDRS, (79) 375A; memorandum prepared in Office of Chief Naval Operations for the Secretary of the Navy, ‘Financial Crisis in Jordan’, 20 June 1957, DDRS, (70) 376A.
National Security Council Memorandum, ‘U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, 4 November 1958, NSC 5820/1. Military action to protect European oil supplies was suggested only as a last resort and with the recognition that ‘this course … could not be indefinitely pursued’.
The correspondence is printed in Department of State Bulletin, 29 (20 July 1953): 74–7.
The exchange was officially released, along with the January messages, on 9 July, in both Tehran and Washington.
Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) pp. 54–90, 94–6; Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1953, 579–81.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963) p. 163.
US, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 1953 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1977) 5: 384–7.
Eisenhower, The White Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965) p. 266.
Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964) p. 404.
Department of State memorandum of conversation with the President, 15 June 1958, DDRS, (81) 371B.
Ibid, (quotes); Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 265.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 276; Department of State to US Embassy, Beirut, 19 June 1958, DDRS, (77) 134C; Department of State memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador of Italy, 25 June 1958, DDRS, (76) 101A; see also note 31 above.
Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, 14 July 1958, DDRS, (79) 12D (quote); Department of State to all US Diplomatic Posts, 14 July 1958, DDRS, (77) 134G; Department of State to US Embassy, Paris, 14 July 1958, DDRS, (76) 101H.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 270.
Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1958: 555.
Memorandum of conference with the president, 24 July 1958, DDRS, (77) 355A. The Lebanon affair ended on a note of irony. In early June, President Nasser had contacted the United States with a three part formula for pacifying Lebanon: a) Chamoun would serve out his term (which expired on 28 September); b) Lebanese army commander General Fuad Chehab would become president; c) the opposition would be granted amnesty. Washington forwarded the proposal to Chamoun without endorsement, for as Dulles explained in a cable to Beirut, the United States would not ‘become accomplice with Nasser’ in anything the Lebanese government did not want. Chamoun obliged by ignoring Nasser’s initiative. Now, after the intervention in July, US envoy Robert Murphy brokered a settlement remarkably similar to the Nasser plan; a) Chamoun would finish out his term; b) the Chamber of Deputies would elect General Chehab to succeed him; and c) the new regime would pursue a policy of conciliation. So with respect to Lebanese internal politics, the outcome of the intervention was a solution that might have been achieved five or six weeks earlier with the co-operation of archenemy, Nasser. Moreover, Eisenhower had never fully appreciated the moderating role played by General Chehab. A Christian like Chamoun, Chehab had refused to order the army into offensive action against the Moslem rebels for fear of splitting his troops on religious lines and igniting full-scale confessional war. For Eisenhower, however, Chehab was derelict in his duty and should have been fired. Had the firing occurred, and a more aggressive commander put in Chehab’s place, Murphy might not have achieved such success in sponsoring the political settlement that Nasser had largely devised; Department of State to US Embassy, Beirut, 11 June 1958, DDRS, (81) 371A; State Department report of the history of the Lebanon crisis prior to 25 June 1958, DDRS, (76) 100J; Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, 14 July 1958, note 34 above.
Minutes, bipartisan leadership meeting, 12 August 1956, DDRS, (76) 217B.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 50.
Memorandum of conference with the president, 29 October 1956, 7.15pm, DDRS, (78) 449D (quote); Memorandum of conference with the president, 29 October 1956, 8.15pm, DDRS, (78) 450A.
Eisenhower to Dulles (in Paris), 12 December 1956, DDRS, (76) 217D.
Eisenhower diary entries for 11 January and 8 March 1956, in Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 307–8, 318–9 (quote).
Eisenhower diary entry for 28 March 1956, Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 323–4; memorandum by Dulles to the president, ‘Near Eastern Policies’, 28 March 1956, DDRS, (80) 302B (quote).
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© 1986 William Stivers
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Stivers, W. (1986). America Moves into the Middle East. In: America’s Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948–83. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08398-5_2
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