Abstract
While the Foreign Office felt that the successful Moscow Conference should be followed up by an imaginative political initiative or a generous gesture of good will, the Combined Chiefs of Staff took the opposite view. They felt that the time had come to make some demands on the Russians. To the Combined Chiefs the Moscow Conference was yet another exercise in appeasement. Their view was that
At the Moscow Conference the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In future the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests of the Soviets.
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Notes and References
Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Martel, An Outspoken Soldier: His Views and Memoirs (London, 1949) p. 221.
Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940–1965 (London, 1966) 28 Nov. 1943.
Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (London, 1959) p. 140.
Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War (New York, 1979) pp. 133–44.
Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947 (London, 1982) p. 191.
See particularly: Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London, 1977) and Stalin’s Secret War (London, 1981).
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© 1986 Martin Kitchen
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Kitchen, M. (1986). Teheran and its Aftermath. In: British Policy Towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08264-3_8
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