In the summer of 1942 the Ministry of Information reported that there was growing impatience about a second front.1 As the German advance continued, public opinion tended to feel that the second front might be too late, and there was a suspicion that Britain was leaving Russia and Germany to fight it out because the Government did not want Russia to come out of the war too strong.2 When the battle for Stalingrad began in September there was an extraordinary wave of sympathy for the Soviet Union and a widespread conviction that Stalingrad would fall unless something dramatic was done to relieve the pressure on the Russian front. Sympathy for the Soviet people in their life and death struggle did not necessarily involve an uncritical attitude towards Soviet society. In the words of one report,

The recollection of eulogy and anathema rapidly succeeding one another, often in the same quarters, has produced considerable cynicism as well as an appreciable devaluation of the organs of opinion in the public mind.


Prime Minister High Frequency Radar Soviet Society Soviet Authority Liberate Country 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. 29.
    Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 2 (London, 1970) p. 547.Google Scholar
  2. 42.
    Joan Beaumont, Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941–1945 (London, 1980) p. 135.Google Scholar
  3. 52.
    Anthony Powell, The Military Philosophers (London, 1968) p. 112.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martin Kitchen 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Kitchen

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations