The Russian Enigma

Abstract

When the Red Army invaded Eastern Poland on 17 September 1939 it came as no great surprise to the British Government. Although nothing was known of the terms of the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact which had been signed just over one month before, and which made the Soviet Union a partner of Nazi Germany fully entitled to her share of the spoils of aggressive war, there were clear indications that the Red Army was about to pounce on a hapless Poland. The British Embassy in Moscow reported that the conclusion of the Soviet armistice with Japan and the concentration of troops in the west were indication that an attack on Poland was likely.¹ The Government was not particularly concerned about this report. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, told the Cabinet that Soviet mobilisation was a precautionary move, and added that the Soviets might desire to secure a portion of Polish territory to improve their defensive position against a possible threat from Germany. This point of view was not challenged by his Cabinet colleagues.² Five days after this Cabinet meeting Soviet troops crossed the borders of Poland. Speaking on behalf of the Foreign Office, Sir Lancelot Oliphant told the Cabinet that the Soviet invasion of Poland was not an eventuality covered by the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 1939, which referred to a ‘European power’ which was understood by both parties to the agreement to mean Germany.³