In the last chapter, I argued that aesthetic judgments, judgments about the goodness and badness of works of art, were in an important sense objective. For it is true or false, verifiable or falsifiable, that a work of art does or does not, probably may or almost certainly cannot, give satisfaction to those who may attend to it. Here are facts about works of art which have a direct bearing on their value, on how good or bad, great or insignificant, they are. Having thus dealt with the fact-value dichotomy, that pons asinorum of aesthetics, one can try to tackle the next two fundamental problems in the field: (i) What is aesthetic satisfaction? (ii) What kinds of artifacts, actions, productions, clusters of events, or whatever, tend to promote such satisfaction, and why? I intend in this chapter to give an answer to the former question, and to deal with the latter in the remainder of the book.
KeywordsCoherence Expense Clarification Milton Prose
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