Abstract
South African leaders have generally insisted that her nuclear programme is peaceful. However, leaders as far back as Prime Minister Verwoerd in the 1960s (before the announcement of the development of her enrichment technology) have frequently stated that South Africa was developing or had developed the capability to produce nuclear weapons.1 Such statements have usually been followed by qualifications or denials, often by Atomic Energy Board officials wishing to preserve external nuclear cooperation, that this was South Africa’s intention. (The intentions behind South Africa’s nuclear programme are discussed in the next chapter.) Thus, in 1971, the head of the Board, Dr A. J. A. Roux, stated that, with her own enrichment technology, South Africa had a nuclear weapons capability, although it was her policy to use her enriched uranium for peaceful purposes. He stated that it would have been difficult to produce a plutonium bomb because material and equipment would have had to be imported and these would then have come under safeguards.2 Similarly, the vice-chairman of the Board, Dr Louw Alberts, claimed, after the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, that South Africa could also produce atomic weapons and that her nuclear programme was more advanced than that of India.3
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
Examples of such statements are quoted in African National Congress, Conspiracy to Arm Apartheid Continues (Bonn: ANC, 1977) pp. 70–1.
Newsweek, 17 March 1976, cited in Zdenek Červenka and Barbara Rogers, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (London: Julian Friedmann, 1978) p. 213.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1974 (London: IISS, 1975) p. 35.
UN Centre for Disarmament, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, South Africa’s Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, Report of the Secretary-General, Document A/35/402 (New York: United Nations, 1981) p. 20.
See Richard K. Betts, ‘A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa’s Nuclear Potential’ in Joseph A. Yager (ed.), Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1980) p. 304.
One may note that Adelman and Knight had already foreseen that South Africa’s objective may have been to develop such a battlefield weapon. See Kenneth Adelman and Albion Knight, ‘Can South Africa go Nuclear?’, Orbis, 23 (1979) 643.
New York Times, 28 February 1965, cited in J. E. Spence, ‘The Republic of South Africa: Proliferation and the Politics of “Outward Movement”’, in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus (eds), Nuclear Proliferation PHASE II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1974) p. 215 (emphasis added).
Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents, XV, 1982–3 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1984) p. B767.
See, for example: ibid.; Richard K. Betts, ‘A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?’, International Security, 4 (1979) 103–4;
Robert S. Jaster, ‘Politics and the “Afrikaner Bomb’“, Orbis, 27 (1984) 830.
See: Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Nuclear “Gray Marketeering”’, International Security, 1 (1977) 112;
George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) pp. 98, 199;
Robert E. Harkavy, ‘Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation’, International Organization, 35 (1981) 157;
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1981–1982 (London: IISS, 1982) pp. 21–2.
Richard E. Bissell, South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982) p. 116.
J. E. Spence, ‘South Africa: The Nuclear Option’, African Affairs, 80 (1981) 442; Červenka and Rogers, The Nuclear Axis, p. 230;
Gene I. Rochlin, ‘The Development and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons Systems in a Proliferating World’., in John Kerry King (ed.), International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979) p. 14;
Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (University of Chicago Press, 1984) p. 29.
UN Centre for Disarmament, South Africa’s Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, pp. 22–3; Červenka and Rogers, The Nuclear Axis, p. 229; George H. Quester, ‘The Politics of Twenty Nuclear Powers’, in Richard Rosecrance (ed.), The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972) p. 56.
Červenka and Rogers, The Nuclear Axis, pp. 234–5; Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects (London: Praeger, 1979) p. 235;
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1976) p. 142.
Ibid.; Barbara Rogers, ‘The Nuclear Threat from South Africa’, Africa, January 1981, p. 45; Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents, XIII, 1980–1 (London: Africana Publishing Co., 1981). pp. B809–10;
James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet Books, 1984) pp: 38–71; Guardian, 18 November 1982; Newsweek, 29 September 1980.
Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, p. B809; Guardian , 2 October 1980.
Copyright information
© 1987 J. D. L. Moore
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Moore, J.D.L. (1987). South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Capability. In: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07828-8_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07828-8_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-07830-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-07828-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)