The Limitations of Arms Control: the Need for a New Beginning?

Abstract

In its present form, arms control has fallen into serious disrepute. Since this is the case we will consider this first before examining (in the next chapter) new approaches arising from President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech delivered on 23 March 1983. This is not a surprising state of affairs considering the protracted and periodic nature of the US—Soviet arms limitation negotiations. The Salt II Treaty is still unratified; the START, INF talks were suspended in 1983; initiatives to reduce conventional weapons in the European theatre (MBFR), to arrive at a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB), to regulate forces in the Indian Ocean, and to control arms transfers have all made little or no progress. Never has so much talk resulted in so little. Hopes rose again in 1985 as East—West arms talks were resumed but critics from the left, right and centre have, however, provided a chorus of condemnation for the process of formal arms control negotiations, rushing forward to explain why, after three decades of talks, the two super-powers are still locked into an unmistakable arms race. Using some of these critiques as a base, we will attempt to examine the fundamental objectives of arms control itself, evaluate its present difficulties in meeting these objectives, and review two popular alternatives and then a radically different approach based on strategic defence which may provide answers for some of Europe’s more obvious defence deficiencies. This discussion assumes some relevance given the super-power commitment to negotiate at three international levels: START, INF and on the question of defensive technology in space.