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Abstract

The breakdown of the Summit Meeting in 1960 produced a position of immobilism in Soviet-Western relations. The Summit failure coupled with the forthcoming Presidential Elections in America, meant that leading administration officials turned their attention in 1960 to tasks other than nuclear arms control.1

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Notes and References

  1. See, for example, George Kistiakowski, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) p. 378.

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  2. A. M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965) p. 452; Wright, p. 120; Interview material.

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  3. Schlesinger, p. 453. On Kennedy’s attitude to nuclear weapons and a test ban, see William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (London, 1964) pp. 40–44.

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  4. Eisenhower reportedly told President-elect Kennedy that he favoured test resumption, G. T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khruschev and the Test Ban (Berkeley, 1981) p. 25.

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  5. None the less in the wider framework of defence policy, the Kennedy Administration quickly sought to effect changes: to emphasise greater reliance on conventional forces and more survivable strategic nuclear forces. See, for example, W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964).

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  6. A. C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defence Programme, 1961–69 (New York, 1971).

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  7. Interview material. Schlesinger, pp. 430–3; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 153, 145–6; A. Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London, 1968) pp. 224–5.

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  8. Documents on Disarmament ACDA, 1962, pp. 991–5. On Soviet attitudes see L. P. Bloomfield, W. C. Clemens, and F. Griffiths, Khruschev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–64 (Cambridge, 1966).

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  9. Hailsham, Rt Hon. The Lord, The Door Wherein I Went (London, 1978), p. 215.

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  10. L. W. Martin, British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional, Adelphi Paper 61 (London, 1969) pp. 1–2.

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  11. R. Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958–78 (Toronto, 1979) p. 63.

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  12. US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1963, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1964, p. 220.

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  13. H. B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity (Westport, Conn., 1973) pp. 129–30.

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  14. Interview material; W. A. Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World (London, 1971) p. 95.

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  15. E. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965) p. 736.

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© 1986 J. P. G. Freeman

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Freeman, J.P.G. (1986). Macmillan and Kennedy: The Test-ban Negotiations, 1960–3. In: Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–68. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07807-3_5

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