On the development of the debt crisis banks needed to create an administrative infrastructure to deal with the policy issues and the administrative process of rescheduling. The argument for one unit, rather than having the work dispersed among the people who dealt with the particular countries, was that there was a store of expertise which could best be applied over all the similar problems. The administrative systems for recording and handling the debt, and the policy issues which arose in negotiation with other banks and with the countries, were specialised areas of expertise and it was most economical to build these up in one spot and have them applied to all the similar problems. However, many banks left the responsibility with those people who had been dealing with the borrower in the first place.
KeywordsIncome Explosive Smoke Argentina Defend
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Notes and References
- 2.For greater details see G. G Johnson, with Richard K. Abrams, Aspects of the International Banking Safety Net, IMF Occasional Paper No 17, IMF, Washington DC, March 1983 p. 9, andGoogle Scholar
- 3.See article by Peter Cooke in Aussenwirtschaft, May 1984.Google Scholar
- 4.See Richard Dale, ‘Bank Supervision Around the World’, Group of Thirty, New York, 1982.Google Scholar
- 6.For a full report on Banco Ambrosiano and on its Chairman, see Robert Cornwall, God’s Banker, Gollancz, London, 1983, andGoogle Scholar
- Larry Gurwin, Death of a Banker, Hutchinson, 1983.Google Scholar
- 8.Richard Dale, The Regulation of International Banking, Woodhead-Faulkner 1984.Google Scholar