A wise chronicler of nuclear strategy has observed that “much of what is offered today as a profound and new insight was said yesterday; and usually in a more concise and literate manner.”1 The same could be said for imaginative solutions to the domestic condition of strategic stalemate. After all, each camp has long had its own list of preferences for arms control and nuclear weapon developments over which battles have been waged for almost four decades. Those of a more reflective or less partisan nature have offered conciliatory ideas in the past, but lasting coalitions haven’t been able to form. The essence of the problem is not so much discovering the grounds for consensus as it is working out the bargains needed to make sound positions sustainable.
KeywordsEurope Assure Expense Dition Triad
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- 1.Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. xv.Google Scholar
- 3.Bernard Brodie, “Technology, Politics and Strategy,” in Problems of Modern Strategy ( London, Chatto and Windus, 1970 ), p. 167.Google Scholar
- 5.Senator Henry M. Jackson’s term. See Congressional Record, August 8, 1972, p. S.129–48.Google Scholar
- 6.Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony, A Forward Strategy for America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961 ), pp. 322, 292.Google Scholar
- 8.See McGeorge Bundy, “MX Paper: Appealing, But Mostly Appalling,” New York Times, April 17, 1983.Google Scholar