Abstract
Ideologically- and operationally-minded nuclear weapon strategists part company over the military utility of nuclear weapons due to their different readings of Soviet motivation. Those who stress the ideological commitment of the Soviet state to expansion are more inclined to accept the Politburo’s willingness to use conventional and nuclear weapons to accomplish their aims.
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Notes
William R. Kintner, “Arms Control and National Security: A Caveat,” in James E. Doughtery and J. F. Lehman, eds., Arms Control for the Late Sixties ( Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1967 ), p. 35.
James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower ( Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977 ), p. 73.
See Morton H. Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (April 1961), pp. 360–85, and James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 96–102.
Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, ( New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961 ), p. 20.
Colin Gray, “Presidential Directive 59: Flawed But Useful,” Parameters, Journal of the United States Army War College, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1981), p. 33.
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See Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975), and Congressional Record, Senate, July 29, 1970, p. 263–86.
Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk, The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1980 ), p. 24.
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© 1984 Michael Krepon
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Krepon, M. (1984). The Military Utility of Nuclear Forces. In: Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_5
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