Abstract
Stationary threats do not lay claim to the emotions or arrest the attention for very long. What makes the Soviet threat so compelling to nuclear weapon strategists is its expansionary character. Even those strategists who acknowledge the attenuation of Soviet ideological fervor and its limited export market have not contended that this in any way diminishes the dangers facing the West. On the contrary, in its weakened condition (or in reaction to the weakened condition of the West) the Soviets can be expected to continue their implacable hostility and opportunistic expansionism.
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Notes
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© 1984 Michael Krepon
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Krepon, M. (1984). The Soviet Threat. In: Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_2
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