Abstract
Consensus bargaining is most possible over common objectives that can readily be reduced to numerical calculations, like parity, reductions, and greater survivability. Arms control and nuclear weapon strategists will have far more difficulty working on common approaches to broader concepts like strategic stability and the requirements of deterrence where there are no agreed definitions or means of implementation. In general, the more diffuse the objective, the greater the difficulty there can be in bridging differences between the two domestic camps.
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Notes
See Barbara Tuchman, “The American People and Military Power in an Historical Perspective,” Adelphi Papers, No. 173 (Spring, 1982), pp. 5–13.
Gilpatric, “Our Defense Needs,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April, 1964), pp. 368–69.
Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1980 ), p. 99.
Abram Chayes, “An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 85: 905, 1972, p. 968.
Richard N. Perle, “What Is Adequate Verification?” SALT II and American Security, ( Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1980 ), p. 58.
Richard Perle, “SALT II: Who Is Deceiving Whom?”, Intelligence Policy and National Security, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff et al., eds., (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1981 ), pp. 151–154.
Michael R. Gordon, “Can Reagan Blow The Whistle On the Russians While Saying No On Salt II?” National Journal, May 7, 1983, pp. 953–57.
Henry L. Stimson, “The Challenge to Americans,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (October, 1947 ), p. 9.
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 266.
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© 1984 Michael Krepon
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Krepon, M. (1984). Tacit Agreements. In: Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_10
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