Abstract
Among distinguished economic theorists, Kenneth Arrow stands out, not just for his superb combination of analytical skill and economic intuition, but also for his wide philosophical interest in the social and psychological background to economic activity. More than most economists, he displays an awareness of (and sensitivity to) the limitations of the economic approach to society and a willingness to build bridges to cognate disciplines. My original thought in embarking on this chapter was to attempt to reconstruct Arrow’s views on such broader issues from his writings, but this proved too difficult and elusive a task. Stimulating comments upon (and insights into) such questions are to be found scattered through his work, but they tend to remain undeveloped — scattered pearls of wisdom not easily roped together.
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© 1987 George R. Feiwel
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Whitaker, J.K. (1987). The Limits of Organization Revisited. In: Feiwel, G.R. (eds) Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_20
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