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Abstract

Lindbeck (1985), in his discussion of the Nobel Prize in Economics, gives social choice theory barely half a sentence, though Arrow himself is otherwise treated quite fairly. So there is a view that the theory of social choice may not be Arrow’s greatest contribution to economic and social science. Yet it seems quite clearly to be his most distinctive and original contribution. One can argue indefinitely and fruitlessly over whether Gerard Debreu, Lionel McKenzie, Leonid Hurwicz and others would eventually have filled in the gaps left if Arrow had remained a meteorologist and never worked in general equilibrium theory. They might have filled the gaps, even though they would have been huge. One can also argue whether other aspects of Arrow’s work, in risk, uncertainty, information, etc. can be seen as pushing economic science much more rapidly in the right direction, but a direction it was moving toward anyway. Other workers in these fields have benefited enormously from the vast strides made by Arrow’s work, but they would probably have done similar things, perhaps considerably more slowly, even in his absence.

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© 1987 George R. Feiwel

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Hammond, P.J. (1987). Social Choice: the Science of the Impossible?. In: Feiwel, G.R. (eds) Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_2

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