Abstract
Our approach to this point has been primarily to consider the nature of welfare optimal behaviour for natural monopoly. Henceforth we deal with the operation of various governance structures for natural monopoly. In this chapter, and in Chapter 6, we will be concerned with regulation of privately-owned natural monopoly. This is mainly a US phenomenon. However, in view of the interest in privatisation, for example, the sale of half of the stock of British Telecom to the public, the efficiency consequences of US regulation may be of interest outside the USA. In view of this we have attempted to compare the efficiency properties of various governance structure for natural monopoly, including rate-of-return regulation and public enterprise, by means of comparative institutional assessment in Chapter 7.
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© 1986 Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer
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Crew, M.A., Kleindorfer, P.R. (1986). Origin and Operation of Regulation in the USA. In: The Economics of Public Utility Regulation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07295-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07295-8_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-07297-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-07295-8
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