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Radio Intelligence and its Role in the Battle of the Atlantic

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The Missing Dimension

Abstract

To form a real understanding of the role which radio intelligence played in the decision-making processes at the various levels of command, and in the conduct of their operations during the Second World War, we need to have a clear picture of three aspects: firstly, the organisation and the operational methods used by the fighting services and their leaders; secondly, the different methods used by the different services of different belligerents for their respective communications, and the cryptographic systems used to make those communications secure against enemy intelligence; and thirdly, the technological methods used by the cryptanalysts on the other side and their relationship to the intelligence staffs and the decision-making bodies at the various levels of command.

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Notes and Reference

  1. Hinsley F. H. with Thomas, E. E., Ransom, C. F. G. and Knight, R. C., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. II (London 1981). Appendix I: British Cypher Security During the War, pp. 631–42.

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  2. Information from the weekly xB-Berichte-Series, See note 1 above, SRS-548. Also Bonatz, Heinz, Seekrieg im Ather, Die Leistungen der Marine-Funkaufklärung 1939–1945 (Herford, Mittler, 1981).

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  3. Main source: Kriegstagebuch des Befehlshabers der U-Boote 1939–1945. (Original in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg.) Also, Dönitz, Karl, 10 Jahre und 20 Tage, 7. Aufl. (München, 1980). Mit einem Nachwort über die Schlacht im Atlantik in der historischen Forschung 1980. Rohwer, Jürgen, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943: The Battle HX.229 and SC.122 (London, Ian Allan, 1977); Douglas, W. A. B. and Rohwer, J., ‘The Most Thankless Task Revisited: Convoys, Escorts and Radio Intelligence in the Western Atlantic 1941–1943’, in The RCN in Retrospect (ed. James Boutilier, Vancouver, Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1982) pp. 175–234.

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  5. Personal information from the British, American and Canadian experts P. Beesly, E. E. Thomas, P. Calvocoressi, Sir H. Marchant, M. Pain, K. Knowles and P. McDiarmid. Also, Rohwer, J. and Jäckel, E., Dïe Rolle der Funkaufklärung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, Motorbuch, 1979).

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  7. Beesly, Patrick, Rohwer, Jürgen and Knowles, Kenneth, ‘Special Intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British, the German, the American View’, in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History, Papers from the Third Naval Academy History Symposium, Robert W. Love (ed.) (New York, Garland 1980), pp. 413–49.

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  8. Hinsley, op. cit., Vol. II, appendix 19, ‘The Breaking of the U-boat Enigma (Shark)’, pp. 747–52.

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  9. Bonatz, op. cit., pp. 245–57.

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Authors

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Christopher Andrew David Dilks

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© 1984 Christopher Andrew, Robert Cecil, David Dilks, David Kahn, Ian Nish, Eunan O’Halpin, Alasdair Palmer, Harry Howe Ransom, Jürgen Rohwer, Jean Stengers, Wesley K. Wark

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Rohwer, J. (1984). Radio Intelligence and its Role in the Battle of the Atlantic. In: Andrew, C., Dilks, D. (eds) The Missing Dimension. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07234-7_9

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