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Abstract

As H. A. Prichard said,1 in acting, we ‘butt into’ the world, and look for differences which our butting in makes. This is particularly so when we are trying to detect causes. We think our actions make a difference to the ‘course of events’. They make a difference primarily through our moving other things about. Not all movements are actions — my falling down is not an action but something I undergo, and which I experience from inside as something painful happening to me. Movements which are actions are experienced from inside as intentionally directed. What is experienced is not our willing bodily movements to take place, and then finding that they do (or perhaps don’t). It is an experience of activity taking shape through bodily movements in a world in which we are also moved (this can be said independently of whether we take a determinist or indeterminist view of how these movements originate).

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Notes and References

  1. H. A. Prichard, in ‘Acting, Willing and Desiring’ in The Philosophy of Action, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. Alan R. White (1968) p. 65.

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  2. Donald Davidson, ‘Agency’ in Actions and Events (Oxford, 1981) p. 59.

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  3. See J. Feinberg, ‘Action and Responsibility’ in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black (Cornell, 1965 ) p. 146.

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  4. Arthur Danto, in ‘What we can do’, Journal of Philosophy Lx (1963).

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© 1984 Dorothy Emmet

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Emmet, D. (1984). Actions. In: The Effectiveness of Causes. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07165-4_5

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