Causation is generally thought to be a relation between two units, one the cause, the other the effect. Since Hume’s attack on necessary connection, philosophers have been very aware of a problem about what kind of a relation this is. They have been less concerned over what are the kinds of unit between which the relation is supposed to hold. There are various candidates, of which a short list would contain facts, states of affairs, properties, events, and in contemporary discussions the preferred candidate has been events.
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Notes and References
- 1.I owe this last example to D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge, 1981 ) p. 119.Google Scholar
- 6.C. J. Ducasse, ‘On the Nature and Observability of the Causal Relation’, Journal of Philosophy (1926) no. 23.Google Scholar
- 7.See Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London, 1948) pp. 476 ff.Google Scholar
- 8.Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics. §§442–6; 2nd edn (London, 1937) pp. 469–73.Google Scholar
- 9.A. Michotte, La Perception de le Causalité (Lourain, 1946 )Google Scholar