Abstract
The fuller implications of the findings set out in the previous chapters for such fields as Social Psychology, Political Science, Legal Philosophy and the Sociology of Law cannot be pursued in detail here. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the spatial constraints of a concluding chapter, some, at least, require elaboration.
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Notes and References
For his denial of this strong sense of ‘discretion’ in a judge see ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ in R. Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: R. Blackwell, 1970) p. 25.
See ‘No Right Answer’ in P. Hacker and J. Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society (Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 58, and
‘Can Rights be Controversial?’ in R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard Universiy Press, 1977).
J. W. Howard, ‘Role Perceptions and Behaviour in Three US Courts of Appeals’, 39 J. of Pol. (1977) 916 at p. 922.
See M. Mandel, ‘Dworkin, Hart, and the Problem of Theoretical Perspective’, 14 Law and Soc. Rev.. (1979) 57.
W. Thomas, The Child in America (New York: Knopf, 1928) p. 584.
See e.g. E. P. Thomson, Whigs and Hunters (New York: Pantheon, 1975), and
I. D. Balbus, The Dialectics of Legal Repression (New York: Russell Sage, 1973).
H. Weschsler, ‘Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, 73 Harv. L.R.. (1959) 1.
For a similar argument, see J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980) chap. 3.
E. g. Robert Summers, ‘Two Types of Substantive Reasons’, 63 Cornell L.R. (1978) p. 707.
E.g. Philippe Nonet, 68 California L.R. (1980) 263.
See Appendix and M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (Yale University Press, 1975).
E.g. Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’; Prott, ‘Updating the Judicial Hunch’, p. 468; and H. Friendly, ‘Reactions of a Lawyer — Newly become a Judge’, 71 Yale L.J. (1961) 218 at p. 231.
Lord Hailsham, ‘The English Law and Its Future’, p. 265. One alternative solution put forward recently is the increased use of amicus curiae by interested groups or the Executive to provide more broadly based inputs into the judicial law-making process. See Lord Simon, ‘Some Judicial Processes in England’, 1 Liverpool L.R.. (1979) at p. 17 and
R. Dhavan, ‘Judicial Decision-Making’ (Mimeo, Delhi University, 1979).
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© 1982 Alan Paterson
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Paterson, A. (1982). The Final Curtain?. In: The Law Lords. Oxford Socio-Legal Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06918-7_8
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