US Military Power: The Realities

Abstract

In Washington we call this the dangerous decade, and I think probably throughout Europe it is categorised in the same way. We need to have some very profound examinations of the security issues facing our countries in the Alliance. The tendency since World War II has been to divide the world up into regions and to look at the world with blinkers on and to consider, for example, the central region of Europe or south-east Asia as isolated areas that may be addressed without impact on other regions. We in the United States with help from some of our Allies fought in Korea and drew down our military capability on other parts of the world and got away with it. We fought a war in Vietnam, again drew down our capabilities in Europe and other parts of the world and were able to get by with that because we had strategic superiority and the Soviets had a very limited power projection capability. Well, this is not true anymore; and so what happens in one part of the world is likely to have a great impact elsewhere. It is unlikely that any conflict with the Soviet Union would be restricted to one place. So we must, therefore, be able to handle crises and even major crises simultaneously without drawing down on one area to any great degree in order to address the problem in another area.

Address given to the RUSI on 22 October 1981