The Legacy of the 1970s

Abstract

While quantitative analyses are an inescapable starting point for comparing competing forces, the difficulties in compiling comparable figures make a mere quantitative comparison an inexact and uncertain measure. If the US-Soviet balance is difficult to assess it is, at least, possible to suggest that the imbalance has grown in recent years and shows no signs of slackening, and that by every measurement we can apply it represents a matter for serious concern. Nevertheless, it is as well to be aware that the image and reality may have little in common; that the trade-off between systems often represents nothing more than an order of magnitude; that a straight comparison of numbers is a somewhat narrow basis on which to assess whether specific forces can meet their tasks or not. Even deciding what to count can be confusing. American and Soviet definitions of ‘heavy’ bombers differ considerably. Old weapons count for as much as new. Total inventories present a very different picture from calculations based on counting operational units. In the absence of any accepted conversion formula, no one knows for sure how many bombers compensate for how many ballistic missiles, or what respective weights should be attached to armour as opposed to anti-tank forces.