Skip to main content

Abstract

It is part of received doctrine among specialists in the theory of international trade that unilateral transfers harm the donor country and benefit the recipient. In sharp contrast to that doctrine, it has been asserted by specialists in the theory of economic development that, frequently, foreign aid does more harm than good in the recipient country and operates to the advantage of exporters in the donor country.

The views expressed in this chapter are not necessarily those of the United Nations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Bauer, P. T. (1971) Dissent on Development Studies and Debates in Developmental Economics, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhagwati, J. N., R. A. Brecher and T. Hatta (1982) ‘The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare’ Columbia University, mimeo

    Google Scholar 

  • Brecher, R. A., and J. N. Bhagwati (1981) ‘Foreign Ownership and the Theory of Trade and Welfare’, Journal of Political Economy, 89: 497–511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brecher, R. A., and J. N. Bhagwati (1982) ‘Immiserizing Transfers from Abroad’. Journal of International Economics, 13: 353–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gale, D. (1974) ‘Exchange Equilibrium and Coalitions: An Example,’ Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1: 63–6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guesnerie, R., and J. -J. Laffont (1978) ‘Advantageous Reallocations of Initial Resources’, Econometrica, 46: 835–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kemp, M. C., and S. Kojima (1982) ‘Tied Aid and the Paradoxes of Donor-enrichment and Recipient-impoverishment’, University of New South Wales, mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hatta, T. (1973), ‘Compensation Rules in Multiple-consumer Economies’, Johns Hopkins University, mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Léonard, D., and R. Manning (1982) ‘Advantageous Reallocations: A Constructive Example’, University of New South Wales, mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mosley, P. (1980) ‘Aid, Savings and Growth Revisited’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 42: 79–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ohyama, M. (1972) ‘Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium’, Keio Economic Studies, 9: 37–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papanek, G. F. (1973) ‘Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings and Growth in Less Developed Countries’, Journal of Political Economy, 81: 120–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P. A. (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yano, M. (1982) ‘Welfare Aspects of the Transfer Problem: on the Validity of the “New-orthodox” Presumptions’, Cornell University, mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1985 George R. Feiwel

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kemp, M.C., Kojima, S. (1985). The Welfare Economics of Foreign Aid. In: Feiwel, G.R. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics